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1. INTRODUCTION 
As recent developments in the international energy situation 
have shown, the necessity of utilizing all available sources 
of energy all over the world has become inevitable. This 
also necessitates increased application of nuclear energy 
in the industrialized countries and similarly to an increasing 
extent in the developing countries. However, the many and 
varied problems of ecology, economy and public acceptance 
associated with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy require 
intensive support and close cooperation in the transfer of 
nuclear technology from industrialized to developing countries. 
In addition to cooperation in the R + D sector, the major 
priority in nuclear transfer between the developing countries 
and the industrialized countries was to be found in the past 
in supplying enriched fuel and reactors. The problern of the 
management of spent fuel from nuclear power stations and 
its practical solution will in future also increasingly arise 
in the developing countries with the growing amounts of spent 
fuel elements. It therefore appears meaningful to include 
the issue of managing the back end of the fuel cycle in nego-
tiating the boundary conditions of a nuclear transfer from 
the supplier states to the recipient states, possibly directly 
connected ~.g. with the expert of nuclear power stations. 
A significant view point which in the past has determined the in-
stitutional framewerk and the contractual structure of international 
cooperation in nuclear trade was the non-proliferation aspect. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 intended on the one 
hand to achieve a fixed status quo in the atomic weapons 
sector and on the other hand to enable the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy to be as unrestricted as possible. The 
efforts of various countries to obtain de facto possession 
of nuclear weapons via so-called peaceful explosive devices led 
to a tightening of the contractual boundary conditions in the 
international nuclear sector and, particularly in the United 
States, even culminated in the demand that sensitive activities 
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in the nuclear fuel cycle, such as enrichment or reprocessing, 
should be completely dispensed with. 
Suggestions for adjusting t~is disturbed balance in the nuclear 
trade were discussed on various international committees 
and led to the foundation of the International Nuclear Fu~l 
Cycle Evaluation Conference (INFCE), in which 60 countries 
and various international organizations participated. A central 
event in this important conference was that the proliferation 
question should not be regarded in isolation as a technological 
problern but rather that political parameters and solutions 
should also be increasingly included as boundary conditions 
in international nuclear trade. 
So-called institutional solutions seemed to indicate possibilities 
which could satisfy such boundary conditions. According to 
the definition in INFCE, this type of institution includes 
a wide range of possibilities in the field of multinational 
cooperation such as intergovernmental agreements, technological 
support for research programmes, as well as international 
and multinational institutions. 
The first considerations in the INFCE were aimed at employing 
these institutional solutions in mutual interaction both 
in order to reduce the proliferation risk as well to increase 
supply assurance. Detailed analyses carried out later at 
the Nuclear Research Centre JUlich (KFA) showed that further 
criteria such as cost effectiveness, political independence, 
transfer of sensitive technology etc., should also be considered 
in discussing these models. A further result of these studies 
at the KFA JUlich was that in considering the large number 
of institutional models, multinationalization or international-
ization of plants or materials in the nuclear fuel cycle 
represents a worthwhile subject for further more detailed 
investigations. However, these studies also indicated that 
institutional models with extraterritorial rights or inter-
national organizations as operators of nuclear plants were 
excluded from the outset due to the considerable lass of 
sovereignty for the hast countries of such facill·t· 1es. 
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After suita~le multinational models with respect to the front 
end of the fuel cycle had been analyzed in detail in the 
first subseguent study, this present study intends to concentrate 
on the probiems of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
The following stages will be dealt with more closely: 
- intermediate storage of spent fuel elements 
- reprocessing of spent fuel elements 
- MOX fabrication 
- direct final storage of spent fuel elements 
- final HAW storage. 
Multinational models, or cooperation models, which could 
possibly be applied in the scope of these steps in the fuel 
cycle range from the financial participation of several countries 
in one plant up to the operation of subsidiaries in the partici-
pating countries. A phased model which intensifies bilateral 
cooperation step by step and which accompanies a corresponding 
transfer of technology between the supplier and recipient 
state can indicate ways of relieving the management of spent 
fuel elements for countries with fairly small or nascent 
nuclear programs; the idea of compulsory management of spent fuel 
for countries exporting nuclear reactors is also included 
in the discussions. 
Such models can also be of interest for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, which plays an important part in international 
nuclear trade and in the transfer of nuclear technology to 
developing countries. In addition to siting problems for 
these multinational plants there are also political and economic 
aspects, issues of proliferation as well as of supply assurance 
for nuclear material, facilities and also technologies which 
must be solved before suitable models can be implemented 
to the satisfaction of all the partners. 
The study is structured by questions concerning the selection 
of meaningful models, the necessity of their implementation 
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and the period of their possible application. To this end, 
the future worldwide development of nuclear energy is first 
depicted, paying particular attention to the aspect of nuclear 
transfer to developing countries and problems of spent fuel 
management. Chapter Three deals with the role of international 
safeguards as essential measures for preventing proliferation 
and the potential for possible improvements, as well as other, 
mainly political solutions for reinforcing the non-proliferation 
network which are already currently in Operation. Chapter 
Four shows the status of international discussions of institu-
tional models and in Chapter Five the individual stages of 
the back end are analysed in detail with respect to possible 
advantages and disadvantages in applying such models; the 
main emphasis being on a phased model to improve technology 
transfer with a simultaneous Solution of spent fuel management 
problems. Special requirements for sufficient intermediate 
storage capacity for spent fuel elements is thus included. 
In the final Chapter an attempt is made to answer the question 
of the extent to which acceptance of such models can be ensured. 
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2. PERSPECTIVES OF WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
The necessity of a further extension of nuclear energy and 
its application in a growing number of countries results 
from the uneven distribution of primary energy resources 
throughout the globe, from the heterogeneity of the world 
balance of power and interests as well as from the subsequent 
instability in the currents of world energy trade. These 
reasons force the individual countries to undertake an inde-
pendent, i.e. national, solution of their energy problems 
with respect to long-term assurance of the energy supply 
within their possibilities. The objectives of national energy 
policies are therefore intended to decrease both quantitative 
and qualitative dependence on imports, to diversify the sources 
of primary energy to be used and applying energy in such 
a way as to conserve resources. Since energy imports can 
only be completely dispensed with in _a few cases, the remaining 
import quota must be aimed at world currents of energy trade, 
their capacity development and the expected international 
energy demand profile. In this context, nuclear energy offers 
all technologically highly developed countries a decisive 
large-scale technological alternative to fossil energy carriers 
on the basis of the high energy density of its primary energy 
bases, uranium and thorium, as well as its large potential 
for application in the heating and electricity supply sector. 
Before the application potential of this primary energy source 
can be utilized the step must be taken from thermal to highly 
converting and breeder reactor systems, i.e. the transition 
from the prevailing light-water reactor to the high-temperature 
reactor and fast breeder, which can be realized in the medium 
term. In this way not only the quantitative but also the 
qualitative dependence on imports in the uranium supply is 
minimized and thus the import quota as a whole via the sub-
stitution effect; with the breeder system nuclear energy 
thus becomes more or less a domestic source of energy. The 
decisive aspect is that in the long run the whole nuclear 
fuel cycle can be installed in each country and with sufficiently 
long lead times with thermal reactors, breeder reactors can 
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be fed from this system's "waste". for decades without new 
natural uranium having to be imported. 
In addition to purely technological requirements, nuclear 
energy utilization in a country should also be correlated 
with the size of the power station pool as well as the infra-
structural and administrative circumstances in order to be 
able to present evidence for the point at which utilization 
of nuclear energy should begin and establishment of the nuclear 
fuel cycle should be decided. These ~pecification factors 
are by no means to be quantified in the same way as the ratio 
of domestic primary energy production to domestic primary 
energy consümption, or domestic primary energy reserves to 
domestic primary energy consumption, nevertheless they are 
of at least the same quality as the expected electricity 
growth rates over the next 50 years which have a decisive 
influence on the extension rate of nuclear power stations 
in the electricity sector of a country. 
If these uncertainties are included, then the criteria assumed 
for nuclear energy perspectives in the next 50 years (initiation 
of nuclear energy utilization in a country with a minimum 
electricity demand of 20 TWh/a; closing the fuel cycle and 
breeder utilization at an installed nuclear capacity of approx. 
20 GW) can only be seen as reference values especially since 
socio-political problems of nuclear energy application can 
only be included in the calculations in a qualitative form 
(continuity of extension rates). 
A global nuclear energy strategy based on these criteria 
can lead to the worldwide extension of nuclear energy shown 
in Fig. 2.1 which could achieve an installed nuclear power 
station capacity of almest 4,000 GW in 2030 (in comparison 
to this the installed nuclear power at the end of 1982 was 
173.1 GW) which would be operated in 74 countries of the 
world (see Fig. 2.2). However, this requires that the acceptance 
problems be rapidly overcome and superseded by a continuous 
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further development of nuclear energy·application and the 
timely realization of a spent fuel management strategy which 
can only consist of reprocessing and recycling the useful 
substances in the reactor from the aspects of fuel economy 
and environmental conservation. At the same time as fulfilling 
these prerequisites, it appears that if the model assumptions 
are considered (especially the 20 GW rule) the fuel cycle 
will be closed in 23 countries by 2030 and the step by step 
transition from the light-water reactor to the fast breeder 
will have begun. Breeder capacity in operation by 2030 is 
almest 1000 GW or 25 % of total global nuclear power in that 
year. This breeder application reduces the worldwide demand 
for natural uranium to about two thirds of that without breeder 
utilization. 
In addition to this rather perspective outlock into a possible 
nuclear future, the path by which it is reached is also of 
interesi, i.e. short- to medium-term development in the next 
10 to 20 years. This period is characterized by decisions 
pending in the spent fuel management sector and overcoming 
acceptance problems. 
Excellent operating experience with the world's approximately 
300 working nuclear power plants have shifted the emphasis 
of negative attitudes to nuclear energy towards spent fuel 
management. Experience with commercial facilities is available, 
but spent fuel volumes have not previgusly required large 
plant units /2.1/. Closing the nuclear fuel cycle assumes 
a key position today in the train of an extended application 
of nuclear energy and with respect to acceptance of nuclear 
energy now associated with spent fuel management. The countries 
exporting nuclear power stations are therefore especially 
concerned to close any gaps in the nuclear fuel cycle still 
present in their own country in order to thus obtain competitive 
advantages. However, this is not to say that the countries 
exporting nuclear power stations will automatically take 
on supply and spent fuel management of the exported nuclear 
power stations; they only have the chance of additionally 
affering this in case of emergency. 
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A glance at Tab. 2.1 shows a survey of the fuel cycle activities 
of the most important nuclear exporters. In addition to current 
capacities (in each case the first line) plans for extensions 
within the next few years are also compiled. The Soviet Union, 
which largely provides supplies and spent fuel management 
for the Eastern Bloc, is not represented since there are 
no reliable data about its capacities. On the other hand, 
Japan has been included although it has not yet received 
any export contracts because its entry into the expert market 
can be expected on the basis of its available know-how. 
The advantages of the USA and France are clearly v~sible 
since, if Barnwell receives Operating permission, they will 
have closed fuel cycles on a commercial basis at their disposal. 
The United Kingdom,.Germany and Japan will admittedly be 
able to close gaps in their reprocessing sector, but nevertheless 
in the supply sector they will always be dependent on supplies 
of natural uranium or natural uranium deposits in the recipient 
country. 
These five countries will at least determine nuclear transfer 
in the western world in the next two decades and will thus 
be responsible for the extent to which fissionable materials 
and nuclear technologies are exploited conscientiously and 
peacefully. This means that they must develop appropriate 
modalities and rules for nuclear transfer, and especially 
for spent fuel management, which must be valid over and above 
the national sphere. The more so, the less they are interested 
in undertaking spent fuel management of their exported nuclear 
power stations on their own territories. For example, the 
"20 GW rule" must b d' d e ~scusse again to the end that closing 
the fuel cycle may possibly already appear meaningful at 
an earlier point in the recipient country. 
The criteria which could be decisive for this are discussed 
in detail in the following Chapters. The objective is by 
no means to capture expert trade for the Federal Republic 
of Germany but rather to provide access to the peaceful uses 
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of nuclear energy under non-proliferation conditions for 
all countries interested in nuclear energy and also to counteract 
in the lang term any possible abuse which could be encouraged 
by refusing transfer of nuclear technology. 
--
USA Canada France 
Output of natural urani un 1981 17 100 8 400 3 700 
(in t U/a) j,..1990 14 100 14 100 3 200 
Enrichment 1981 26 400 8 000 -
(in t SWU/a) ~1990 26 900 - 10 800 
Conversion 1981 21 800 4 500 13 000 
(in t U/a) 
-1990 21 800 13 500 15 000 
Fuel element fabrication 1981 3 280 800 
(in t/a) 
.-1990 
Nuclear power stations export 1981 20 937 2 429 5 541 
( in MW ( n e t ) ) 
Reprocessing uo2 1981 - - 400 
( in t Ht-1/ a ) ... 1990 1 500 - 1 600 
(Barnwell?) 
Tab. 2-1: Fuel cycle activities of the most important 
nuclear trading partners in the western world 
Un;i.ted Kingdom Germany . Japan 
( F. R.) 
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-
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3. POLITICAL AND· LEGAL BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
(Existing International Mechanisms) 
3.1 Introduction 
The perspectives for the future global development of nuclear 
energy indicated above lead one to expect that the connection 
between peaceful and military uses can in future represent 
an important aspect of discussions about an appropriate world 
nuclear regulation. The more countries increasingly develop 
their own nuclear programs, the more urgently does the question 
arise about the possibilities of preventing horizontal pro-
liferation. From this point of view it can be expected that 
in the coming years heated disputes will arise about whether 
and to what extent new international instruments will have 
to be created to contain the danger of new nuclear weapons 
states. The planners of fu~ure peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
have to account for these controversies to be expected. If 
this is neglected then the military aspect of nuclear energy 
could become the Achilles' heel of peaceful uses which could 
one day raise extremely difficult fundamental problems of 
further developing peaceful uses. On the one band, the case 
of an actual increase in the -number of nuclear weapons states 
must be considered and the ~ossible resulting reactions of 
the international community. On the other band, it must also 
be taken into account that the sensitization of the public 
to the problems of modern technology could be so extraordinarily 
advanced in future that even minimal aspects of the risks 
of such technologies could be pushed further and further 
into the limelight. From this point of view, the connection 
between peaceful and military uses also requires far-sighted 
planning. 
Discussions in the past decade have adequately demonstrated 
how difficult and intricate the evaluation of this connection 
to the former is. Future considerations will have to be based 
on the practical results of these discussions. It thus also 
appears particularly significant for the subject of ~bis 
study to represent recent developments in this problern area 
in context and to point out existing tendencies. 
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3.2 The Significance of A~t. IV of the Non-P~oliferation T~eaty 
It is to be assumed that the Non-Prolife~ation T~eaty will 
also in futu~e remain the cent~al inst~ument of the international 
community in p~eventing the ho~izontal sp~ead of nuclea~ 
weapons. More than 114 count~ies have signed the T~eaty up 
to now; the most ~ecent signato~y is Egypt. In surveying 
the development in international ~elations in the postwar 
pe~iod, it can be established that the Non-Prolife~ation 
T~eaty appea~s to be the global convention (apa~t f~om relin-
quishment of the use of fo~ce in the UN Charte~) in which 
states have accepted the most far-~eaching lasses of national 
sovereignty; this is t~ue both of the relinquishment of weapons 
acquisition as well as of the acceptance of the safeguards 
system agreed upon in the Treaty. This development seems 
all the more remarkable since these lasses naturally do not 
affect all countries but only those who have not yet detonated 
any nuclear weapons. The Treaty has not yet been Violated 
by any state. Admittedly the fact remains that a number of 
states, whose accession would seem particularly urgent from 
an international point of view because of their status as 
nuclear threshold countries, have not signed the Treaty. 
How p~oblematic the boundary conditions agreed upon in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty appear in ~etrospect can be seen 
from the fact that at the secend review conference in 1980 
the member states were unable to ~each any joint communique 
with a factual content; the most important points of contention 
at the conference were the tardy progress of the nuclear 
weapons states' efforts at disarmament mentioned in Art. VI 
of the T~eaty, as well as the insufficient transfer of nuclear 
energy to the developing countries. 
The role of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the 
regime of the Non-P~olife~ation Treaty is regulated in Art. IV 
of the Treaty. This regulation requires closer elucidation 
since the connection between military and peaceful uses of 
nuclear ene~gy is continually made in international discussions 
and in this respect A~t. IV contains the pertinent regulation. 
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Art. IV shares in the bindingnature of the Treaty as ~ whole 
under international law. An analysis of the wording and history 
of its origins does not reveal any arguments to the contrary. 
The·Federal Republic of Germany in particular emphasized 
the bindingnature of Art. IV even before it came into effect. 
As far as the content of the contractual Obligations in accord-
ance with Art. IV are concerned then considerable difficulties 
appear in their interpretation. The wording is chosen in 
such a way that a clear definition of the contractual obligations 
hardly seems possible. It can on the one hand certainly be 
determined that Art. IV cannot be interpreted in such a way 
that by Art. IV countries are entitled to free access to 
nuclear technology existing in the states under obligation. 
However, on the other hand it can also be safely said that 
it would be contrary to the terms of the Treaty if a state 
under obligation were to absolutely refuse all cooperation 
with third countries in the field of nuclear technology (or 
an essential section thereof). There arealso especially 
good reasons in favour of an interpretation according to 
which a state under obligation is forbidden by Art. IV to 
arrange international cooperation under exclusively commercial 
aspects. Only such an approach assigns the independent obligation 
to cooperation to Art. IV which was to be contained in this 
regulation according to its wording and intention. In practice, 
the NPT signatories have only abided by this rule to a limited 
extent so far. However, it cannot be assumed that the contractual 
obligations have changed in view of this practice. 
In evaluating the Non-Proliferation Treaty from a German 
point of view particular attention must be drawn to the fact 
that Art. IV of the Treaty does not only oblige the nuclear 
weapons states but also all contracting parties who "are 
in a position" to undertake the cooperation mentioned in 
Art. IV. This therefore also includes those non-weapon states 
who already have a developed peaceful nuclear program at 
their disposal. 
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3.3 Possible Further Developments in the Safeguards System 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The central position of safeguards as measures for preventing 
proliferation has been featured agai~ and again in various 
international discussions, such as for example the INFCE 
Conference. Nevertheless, attention has also constantly been 
drawn to the limitation of the technical possibilities of 
IAEA international safeguards. According to the various model 
agreements, IAEA safeguards are not designed to physically 
prevent a diversion or misuse of nuclear material but rather 
only to detect a diversion and thus to give a political mechanism 
consisting of suitable sanctions the opportunity to inter-
vene. Particular significance is attributed to the aspect 
of deterrence which is provided by the risk of discovery. 
The IAEA has always been able to refute in detail any accusations 
about its effectiveness /3.1/. Thus no anomalies have been stated 
in the annual IAEA Safeguards Implementation Reports up to 
now /3.2/. Recent problems arising in safeguarding a Pakistani 
facility are based on the inadequacy of older safeguards 
agreements and not on the limited technical possibilities 
of safeguards themselves. For example, camera systems as 
required by the IAEA to be established in the Pakistani facility 
have already been applied for a considerable time e.g. for 
monitaring German nuclear reactors /3.3/. 
Two sets of problems from recent safeguards discussions are 
to be analysed in this Chapter. Firstly, the demand is made 
in connection with the Iraq affair that the monitaring range 
of safeguards should be extended /3.4/. Namely, in addition 
to current inspection models, in particular the processing 
of undeclared nuclear material in clandestine facilities 
should be made discoverable by suitable detection systems. 
The inherent problems of these general demands for implementing 
the model agreements will be discussed in detail. In the 
_second section the potential of technical improvements in 
the nuclear material accountancy (NRTA) and extended containment & 
surveillance sectors will be dealt with. 
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Real-time-accountancy systems make use of process data in 
order to achieve short-term statements about the flow and 
distribution of nuclear material in a facility. So-called 
extended containment and surveillance systems monitor whole 
sections of the facility by means of electronic sensors such 
as motion detectors or camera systems. The objective of these 
recent improved measures is in particular reduction of inspection 
effort in large sensitive process facilities for enrichment 
and reprocessing. 
3.3.2 Credibility and Technical Salutions 
The question of whether international safeguards can ensure 
a credible deterrent against proliferation on the basis of 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been present throughout 
their existence. However, this problern has dramatically stepped 
into the centre of political and public interest with the 
events in Iraq. Within the framewerk of discussions on increasing 
the effectiveness of present safeguards a series of suggestions 
have been put forward which are particularly intended to 
improve the technical elements of safeguards. 
These comprise: 
1. Further development of measuring, monitaring and control 
instrumentation and their demonstration to the IAEA. 
2. Quantification of safeguards goals: The concept of significant 
quantities of nuclear material and the timely detection 
of a diversion is converted into numerical values and 
should serve as the basis for the conception, implementation 
and evaluation of safeguards systems. 
3. Development of an evaluation method: Systematic approaches 
shall be compiled towards an objective evaluation for 
the comparison of safeguards systems. 
4. Quantification of effectiveness: As apart of Point 3 
the detection probability for all possible diversion 
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seenarios shall be analysed and evaluated on a plant-specific 
basis. 
5. Development of future safeguarcts: approaches for sensitive 
facilities: The established safeguards measures of material 
accountancy and containment & surveillance are to be both 
extended and intensified in order to be able to cover 
the quantified safeguards goals for facilities with a 
large throughput. 
6. Extension of the scope of safeguards: The technical task 
of NPT Safeguards consists of verifying the presence of 
nuclear material subject to safeguards. This is essentially 
laid down in Para. 29 of INFCIRC/153 where nuclear material 
accountancy is taken as the safeguards measure of fundamental 
importance. Considerations concerning the introduction 
of new measures, such as monitaring pipelines at the perimeter 
of the process area,·monitoring operatingparametersnot 
directly related to the flow of nuclear material (process 
monitoring), as well as rapid process inventory taking, 
indicate the beginning of a tendency going beyend pure 
nuclear material safeguards into the plant monitaring 
sector. 
7. Considerations with respect to undeclared nuclear material: 
Demands for including undeclared nuclear material in the 
diversion seenarios is closely connected to the problern 
of misusing facilities. 
So-called near-real-time-accountancy can be mentioned as 
an example of a purely technical solution. In process facilities 
with a large throughput of sensitive material (reprocessing 
plants, MOX fabrication plants etc.) there are doubts about 
sufficient sensitivity with respect to the timeliness of 
detecting the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear 
material by annual inventories alone. Intensive studies are 
currently bei~g undertaken to establish the extent to which 
this Situation can be impro~ed by process inventories repeated 
at brief intervals. The boundary condition is that plant 
- 19 -
operation must not be impaired in any way (principle of non-
intrusiveness~. This generally presupposes additional process 
instrumentation as well as closer cooperation between operator 
and inspector in order to guarantee the credibility of the 
data provided by the operator. 
Previous model studies show that such methods could ensure 
improved safeguards effectiveness with respect to detecting 
abrupt diversions of significant quantities and that they 
would also be in a .position to provide valuable indications 
about protracted, systematic material lasses. This latter 
characteristic is also of particular interest from the aspect 
of oparational process monitaring (criticality control etc.) 
/3.5/. 
A secend example is given by the increased application of 
c/s measures as closed systems for monitaring large process 
areas. These so-called penetration monitaring systems should 
be designed in such a way that all relevant diversion paths 
leading from a defined facility sector are covered by suitable 
instrumentation. However, there are currently problems in 
the practical availability of reliable c/s instruments tested 
and accepted by the IAEA. There are moreover some conceptual 
problems, as for example the logical impossibility of recognizing 
!!! diversion paths as such and monitaring them. The present 
tendency is to proceed with the development and application 
of new, improved c/s equipment, but to continue to consider 
their application as supporting the fundamental measure of 
material accountancy. No other method is possible since in 
the case of a c/s alarm, accounting procedures may, under 
certain circumstances, become necessary again. 
3.3.3 Disadvantages of Purely Technical Salutions 
All approaches for improving and further developing international 
safeguards must be oriented towards the political boundary 
conditions before introducing technical solutions. Problems 
of a legal and conceptional nature which could jeopardize 
the whole safeguards system and its objective must always 
be included in detail when determining new criteria. 
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One of these problems has already been implied; namely the 
appro~ch of changing nuclear material safeguards towards 
plant control. Other suggestions mentioned above also require 
critical commentary. 
From the point of view of systems analysis, it is extremely 
important to have available quantified safeguards goals, 
i.e. significant quantities and timeliness criteria. Inspection 
frequencies, measurement accuracies required for the accountancy 
system, statistical sampling plans for verification etc. 
can be planned and determined on the basis of these types 
of quantity. However, if these quantified goals are used 
as an absolute yard stick which has to be achieved as part 
of a safeguards system then the credibility of safeguards 
can also be questioned in future if, for example, tightened 
safeguards goals are applied to a whole state and not to 
a single facility. Assuming this it is therefore understandable 
that a safeguards system will be neither credible nor feasible 
today or in future. Similar conditions result for large repro-
cessing plants with a high annual throughput of nuclear material 
where the inaccuracy involved in drawing up a balance far 
exceeds the goal quantity. To conclude from this that such 
facilities represent a proliferation risk and therefore should 
not be constructed or Operated is a conclusion Which has 
already been drawn in the past by various parties and which 
has been refuted in detail within the INFCE Study /3.6/. 
Methodologies for evaluating and quantifying safeguards effective-
ness could be especially advantageaus if various safeguards 
concepts are to be compared with respect to their inspection 
and instrumentation effort. However, the limitations of such 
methodologies must also be clearly defined here. Thus for 
example in large process facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle 
an open end to diversion strategies arises with continually 
growing technical complexity. Quantification of the Probability 
of detecting anomalies which are connected with such abuse 
strategies, as well as the effectiveness of corresponding 
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countermeasures to expose these strategies is an extremely 
difficult systems anaiysis problern since a large number of 
subjective elements also have to be included. In conclusion 
it can be said that although progress has been made in the 
nuclear material accountancy sector in quantifying the goals, 
c/s measures are still in their initial stages /3.7/. 
If one summarizes considerations on evaluating effectiveness 
then it becomes apparent that if a state is sufficiently 
motivated and has the appropriate capabilities available 
then it can acquire strategic nuclear material. It is therefore 
doubtful whether a rigorous and systematic documentation 
of all conceivable diversion strategies, as demanded for 
all sensitive facilities under IAEA safeguards, is meaningful 
and whether the general non-proliferation framewerk would 
not thus be exceeded for the IAEA. Safeguards can be regarded 
here as an applied science which is in a situation similar 
to that sometimes occurring in other fields of science, namely 
that theoretical considerations obscure practical experimental 
facts. Thus for example international IAEA working groups 
of experts are discussing possible detection of diversions 
through containment boundaries instrumented with the most 
varied conceivable monitaring instruments, but which ignore 
the fact that current containment-surveillance systems available 
to the IAEA are limited to simple cap-and-wire seals and 
film cameras. 
Proliferation seenarios based on undeclared nuclear material 
in safeguarded facilities must consider two aspects. On the 
one hand, it can be convincingly stated that the credibility 
of safeguards can be increased if one takes the possible 
misuse of a commercial facility with undeclared nuclear material 
into consideration. On the other hand, however, the imputation 
of these seenarios can cast doubt upon both the general objectives 
of safeguards as well as the technical basis with which safe-
guards goals can be achieved. The introduction of undeclared 
nuclear material into a safeguarded facility is of minor signif-
icance if one considers that it would be much simpler for 
a state to produce weapon-grade nuclear material in a clandestine 
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facility. If undeclared nuclear material is to be considered 
in a safeguards system for an NPT signatory state then Para. 29 
of INFCIRC/153 which designates nuclear material accountancy 
as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance seems to 
be completely meaningless. Material accountancy can only 
be employed for declared nuclear material, concealed sources 
of undeclared material channelled into a facility cannot 
in principle be detected by accountancy measures. Nevertheless, 
containment/surveillance measures, already employed to simplify 
accountancy, permit a solution of these problems under cert.ain 
circumstances. 
A similar problem, connected with that of undeclared nuclear 
material, is so-called borrowing of nuclear material. Such 
nuclear material is "borrowed" from a safeguarded facility, 
converted into a weapon-grade form in a safeguarded process 
facility and subsequently used for military purposes. The 
demand for inclusion of so-called borrowed nuclear material 
in diversion scenarios, particularly associated with reprocessing 
and enrichment facilities, would lead to the design of a 
double safeguards system for this type of nuclear material. 
Firstly in the facility from which it was originally diverted, 
and secopdly in the facility where it was reprocessed for 
military purposes. 
Non-proliferation transparency can be increased by additional 
information obtained throughout the whole fuel cycle. A closed 
fuel cycle with corresponding reprocessing would thus have 
advantages. International relations within the framewerk 
of multinational cooperation could also have a part to play 
here by taking the safeguards credit of such models into 
closer consideration. The problern is, however, the extent 
to which considerations of this kind can actually be included 
~ 
in the legal framewerk of INFCIRC/153 or e.g. in negotiations 
on facility attachments. 
The safeguards agreement INFCIRC/153, which forms the basis 
of all bilateral agreements concluded by NPT signatory states, 
defines the tasks of safeguards as follows: 
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" The timely detection of diversion of significant 
quantities of nuclear material f~om peaGeful nuclear 
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown 
and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early 
detection." 
It becomes apparent that this goes beyend the purely technical 
task of detecting a diversion by also including deterrence 
due to the risk of detection for a potential divertor. 
The risk of detection could be simply defined as the product 
of the probability of detection and the consequence of detection. 
The secend factor in this definition has not yet been quantified 
and therefor~ the IAEA only allocated a value to the first 
factor, namely probability of detection, in its provisional 
quantifications of safeguards goals. 90 - 95 % is currently 
assumed. The consequences of detecting an NPT Violation for 
a highly developed non-nuclear weapon-state with a multiplicity 
of international obligations in the economic and trade sector 
must be regarded as very serious. The risk of detection for 
such a state must therefore also be regarded as high even 
if detection probabilities are low, regarded in absolute terms. 
It therefore appears that technical improvements and systems 
analyses in the safeguards sector are feasible, necessary 
and meaningful. However, it must be remernbered that the safeguards 
system should be exclusively limited to the verification 
of declared material and information. If this assumption 
is not made and this safeguards limit is exceeded then suggestions 
of improvements which were originally intended to increase 
the credibility of safeguards could have the opposite effect; 
namely, safeguards objectives and the technical instrumentation 
available can no langer be brought in line. 
By way of summary, it can thus be established that: 
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1. Every member state of INFCIRC/153 is obliged in principle 
to declare all sensitive material; exceptions are only 
valid if this is envisaged in INFCIRC/153. 
2. Only materials entered in the inventory list - compiled 
in accordance with § 41 INFCIRC/153 are subject to 
safeguards by the IAEA; INFCIRC/153 envisages a special 
procedure in § 73 for the case that a state does not 
declare material subject to safeguards. 
3. Within the framewerk of routine inspections, the inspectors 
only have right of access to those strategic points 
which have been expressly agreed upon between the IAEA 
and the member state. Within these strategic points 
the inspector's inspection right also refers to commercially 
sensitive points. 
4. It is the IAEA's task to detect diversion of nuclear 
material. Physical prevention of diversion by the IAEA 
is not envisaged, neither is it feasible. The IAEA has 
fulfilled this task in an excellent fashion. 
3.3.4 Object and Extent of IAEA Safeguards Rights in Accordance 
with INFCIRC/153 
A legally watertight analysis of the questions mentioned 
in certain documents /3.8/ about the extent of IAEA rights 
in accordance with INFCIRC/153 must separate three problems 
from each other. The documents mentioned above mix up these 
questions to some extent which in part considerably impairs 
the clarity of the statements. 
1. Must a signatory state declare all special fissionable 
material to the IAEA in the sense of § 112 INFCIRC/153 
or Art. XX of the IAEA Statute? 
2. Which materials are subject to the IAEA's safeguards 
authority? 
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3. In what manner is the IAEA authorized to fulfill its 
safeguards obligation? 
In particular 
a) Can the IAEA also operate in those areas of a facility 
subject to safeguards where, according to specifications 
from the contracting state, there is no declared 
material? 
b) Can the IAEA also operate in those areas of a safeguarded 
facility in which, according to the specifications 
of the contracting state, there is indeed declared 
material but safeguards are not necessary in these 
areas in order to exercise control functions? 
c) Can the IAEA also operate in those areas of a facility 
subject to safeguards in which there is declared 
material but which, in the view of the contracting 
state, should not be accessible to the IAEA inspectors 
for reasons of protecting commercial know how? 
There is no unambiguous statement about material to be declared 
in INFCIRC/153. § 1 determines that "all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within 
(the state's) territory, under its jurisdiction or carried 
out under its control anywhere" should be subject to IAEA 
safeguards; the formula "in accordance with the terms of 
the Agreement" is appended. § 1 concerns, according to its 
title, the "Basic Undertaking" of the signatory state; § 2 
("Application of Safeguards") similarly determines the material 
sub j ec t t o safeguards. § 7 makes us e of the cla use "all nuc lear 
material subject to safeguards under the agreement". 
§ 40 ("Subsidiary Arrangements") determines that the control 
activities of the IAEA should refer to "the nuclear material 
listed in the inventory provided for in § 41"; however, § 41 
itself only picks up the formula "all nuclear material in 
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the State subject to safeguards under the Agreement" again. 
Finally, -a regulation also of significance in the present 
context is tobe found in § 51, according to which the state 
must als~ inform the IAEA about any material outside the 
facilities. This material is also subject in principle to 
safeguards according to §51. 
Provisions concerning material not subject to any safeguards 
are to be found in § 36 ff. Four categories are formed: 
(a) Material which is applied in certain instruments, 
(b) material which, in a permissible fashion according to 
§ 13, is applied for non-peaceful uses, 
(c) plutonium at a certain concentration and 
(d) slight quantities of material more closely defined in 
§ 37. 
Furthermore it must be remernbered that in accordance with 
§ 2 the purpese of safeguards is to establish that the monitared 
material is not employed for the construction of nuclear 
weapons or explosive devices. If one regards th~ pertinent 
standards depicted here as a whole then there are good reasons 
for saying that all sensitive material must be declared. 
This is particularly indicated by the fact that INFCIRC/153 
intends in principle to subject all material to safeguards 
and that exemptions are separately listed. This technique 
of rule and exception generally indicates that exceptions 
to the rule are only considered where this is expressly en-
visaged. This is especially to be assumed where the exemptions 
are enumerated. The consequent assumption of an obligation 
to make a complete declaration is finally also supported 
by the purpese of IAEA safeguards expressly mentioned in 
INFCIRC/153. 
3.3.5 Which Materials are Subject to the IAEA's Safeguards Obligati~ 
According to § 40 INFCIRC/153 already mentioned, all materials 
listed in the inventory provided for in § 41 are subject to 
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safeguards. T"his inventory is to be compiled by the IAEA 
in the initial phase and afterwards to be adjusted to the 
current situation. All "nuclear material subject to safeguards 
under the Agreement" (§ 41) is to be listed. 
The term "nuclear material" is defined in § 112. This regulation 
refers to Art. XX of the IAEA Statute which precisely defines 
the concepts "special fissionable material" and "source material". 
In this context it must also be noted that § 107 also contains 
its own definition of the term ~inventory change" which assists 
in determining the extent of the member state's obligation 
to report to the IAEA in accordance with § 62 ff. It thus 
appears that the categories of material mentioned in § 107 
must be included in determining the extent of the obligation 
to provide reports; the concept of "nuclear material" in 
the sense of Art. XX of the Statute becomes particularly 
concrete in § 107. 
In interpreting § 41 the question arises of the treatment 
of those materials which are subject to safeguards according 
to the agreement between the IAEA and the signatory state, 
but which nevertheless are not included in the inventory 
compiled in accordance with § 41. The wording of § 40 indicates 
that only those materials actually included in the inventory 
are subject to IAEA safeguards. It could be objected in the 
sense ·or a teleological interpretation that all materials 
in the sense1of § 112 (with the exemptions mentioned) are 
to be included in the inventory and consequently thus also 
subject to safeguards. This argumentation does not, however, 
appear to be compelling. In order to clearly delimit IAEA 
safeguards authority, the formulation of INFCIRC/153 has 
apparently been selected in such a way that the object of 
safeguards is beyond doubt. This consideration also offers 
an explanation for the fact that precisely in § 40 the object 
· of safeguards is not described by the formulation ''all nuclear 
material subject to safeguards" otherwise used in many passages 
in INFCIRC/153. 
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According to this interpretation, the source of cooperation 
between the IAEA and the signatory state should be that this 
cooperation is based on the contracting partners' mutual 
confidence and thus there is no reason to assume that the 
signatory state should not declare material subject to safe-
guards. An approach of this type may seem legally and politically 
doubtful from the perspective which allocates an absolute 
control function to the IAEA and views information from the 
signatory state mistrustfully from the very beginning. On 
the other hand, the fact must not be ignored that every member 
state voluntarily subjects itself to IAEA sateguards and 
therefore this can and must presume a certain trust in its 
readiness to cooperate. 
Whether the solution found in § 40 of INFCIRC/153 in the 
sense of the above interpretation presents the proper mean 
between confidence and distrust from an international standpoint 
is a question of political appraisal. The authors of INFCIRC/153 
apparently replied in the affirmative. Furthermore, the fact 
must not be ignored that §§ 18-22 are exclusively concerned 
with cases of settling disputes and possible treaty violations. 
Moreover, in the case of behaviour contrary to the Treaty 
the member states are entitled to impose permissible sanctions -
in accordance with general international law. 
In this context attention must also be drawn to the "special 
inspections" envisaged in § 73 in case a state apparently 
does not fulfill its contractual Obligations by not making 
the necessary information available to the IAEA. If material 
subject to safeguards were not declared then this would also 
represent a case of information deficit for the IAEA. Procedure 
in such a case is especially laid down in § 77. This pattern 
of regulation supports the interpretation of § 40 as given 
above. 
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3.3.6 How is the IAEA Authorized to ·Exercise its Safeguards 
Responsibilities 
The objective of safeguards is described in § 71 ff. This 
serves to revise the original report and changes occurring 
later. Apart from the objective of safeguards, INFCIRC/153 
expressly regulates the extent of safeguards in § 74 and 
75 and in § 76 the question of IAEA inspectors' right of 
access. § 76 envisages various regulations: 
{a) for controls in connection with the expert of material 
subject to safegu~rds, 
{b) for controls before concluding so-called ~ubsidiary 
Arrangements and 
(c) for routine controls, which are primarily discussed 
here. 
In accordance with § 76 (c), the inspectors' ~ight of access 
during routine inspections is limited to the so-called strategi 
points and to the records to be kept by the Signatory state. 
The strategic points are abstractly defined in § 116 as those 
points in a facility whose monitaring "under normal conditions'' 
ensures the information necessary for implementing safeguards. 
It must be noted here that the purpese of safeguards is to 
verify the presence of nuclear material. According to the 
regulation system of INFCIRC/153, the definition of concept~ 
in § 116 is, however, not directly applicable to safeguarding 
of a specific facility. The strategic points are rather de-
termined by the IAEA in every individual case for each facility 
on the basis of facility-specific data {design information) 
specified in the so-called Subsidiary Arrangements. The IAEA 
decides in detail on the location of the strategic points 
at due discretion after consultation with the safeguarded 
state. 
The special feature of the regulation of access rights in 
INFCIRC/153 results from the fact that inspectors are limited 
to the locations of the strategic points as laid down in 
the relevant "Subsidiary Arrangement". This legal regulation 
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is basically quite clear: it undoubtly results from the fact 
that § 76 (c) expressly determines that the inspectors only 
have access to these points. 
Neither can it therefore be assumed that INFCIRC/153 has 
a loophole in its regulation system. The special rule in 
§ 73 for ''special inspections" draws particular attention 
with respect to the area of access for inspectors that such 
"special'' inspections can also include areas outside the 
sections of the facility. accessible for routine inspections. 
The prerequisites for "special inspections" are also clearly 
determined in this respect in § 77. 
The significance of the existence of commercially sensitive 
areas in a safeguarded facility for the inspectors' right 
of access must be discussed here. The starting point for 
this discussion must be the fact that regulations on inspections 
do not indicate any restrictions for commercially sensitive 
areas. A compromise between the IAEA's safeguards responsibility 
on the one hand and the commercial interests of the safeguarded 
facility on the other can, in accordance with § 46, be achieved 
by an agreement between the IAEA and the safeguarded facility, 
before beginning safeguards activities, about certain areas 
to be exempted from safeguards due to commercial sensitivity. 
It must be noted that § 46 (IV) says that such areas "may 
be· established''. It can be seen from this wording that the 
safeguarded state has no right to insist that the IAEA exempt 
certain areas from safeguards. It can rather be presumed 
that it rests upon the due discretion of the IAEA to create 
and designate exempted areas. 
It is doubtful whether the previous competences and structures 
of the IAEA are appropriate to undertake in future all essential 
international tasks in the sphere of nuclear cooperation. 
If the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continue to develop 
then the associated transfer of technology to non-weapon 
states will have to lead to new efforts in the safeguards 
field. Even if the IAEA were to have more resources available 
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in future to employ in fulfilling its tasks, nevertheless 
it cannot be expected that the IAEA will thus be in a position 
to deal globally with all the problems of storing sensitive 
materials associated·with the back end, or even the supply 
of fissionable material. The IAEA will also have to encourage 
international cooperation in future; this would by no means 
justify designating increased efforts at international coopera-
tion in the back-end sector as unnecessary or superfluous. 
3.4 Prior Consent in Present International Nuclear Policy 
Apart from negotiations about an IPS, the reorientation in 
international nuclear policy since 1977 has largely been 
embodied in the uranium supplier countries' demands for a 
contractual guarantee of so-called prior consent regulations. 
EURATOM has concluded contracts with prior consent agreements 
with two·main suppliers to date, Canada and Australia, the 
agreement with Canada /3.9/ dates from 18th December, 1981, 
the agreement with Australia /3.10/ was concluded on 
21st September, 1982. There is not yet any relevani agreement 
between EURATOM and the USA, although demanded in the NNPA. 
It must also be noted that agreements of the prior consent 
type have not only been made in the past few years. Even 
in previous decades corresponding clauses were found in inter-
national treaties. Nevertheless, it must be stated that the 
particular design and interpretation of these agreements 
have changed quite considerably in the past few years. Whereas 
in earlier contractual practice prior consent in effect only 
demanded the applicability of already existing, precisely 
formulated agreements to subsequent utilization after the 
initial use, the special feature of more recent prior consent 
regulations is to be found in the fact that the supplier 
country examines in each individual case the conditions for 
granting authorizations for the reprocessing in question 
in the sense of its national legislation or at least makes 
agreement to·further utilization dependent on the continuation 
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of a certain situation in energy policy. 
The main point of the demand for prior consent is the effort 
of the supplier countries to ensure the peaceful uses of 
material sold by them. Admittedly, the countries concerned 
regard these efforts as intensified by accedence of the recipient 
state to the NPT, however, they wish to receive further bi-
lateral assurances from the recipient state about utilization 
of the material supplied over and above obligations resulting 
from the NPT. It can thus be concluded that the basis for 
these prior consent demands is to be regarded as a certain 
distrust of the comprehensive efficiency of the NPT in imple-
menting NP policy. The pertinent demands of the supplier 
states refer in detail to (a) preconditions for enrichment 
of uranium in the recipient state, (b) preconditions for 
reprocessing nuclear material in the recipient state and 
(c) transfer to a third country by the recipient state of 
material supplied. 
The recent practice of prior consent in effect involves con-
siderable practical consequences for trade; particularly 
the uranium trade. For a number of economic and political 
reasons, the recipient states have recently been attempting 
to diversify their sources of supply. Due to the variety 
of supply conditions and licensing stipulations according 
to prior consent this means in practice that the recipient 
states have to separately treat and label the uranium supplied 
depending on origin and supply conditions. This has adminis-
trative and financial disadvantages for the recipient. Particular 
complications arise if supply conditions from two or even 
more countries are applied to one and the same material. 
This is in practice by all means possible if, for example, 
uranium is taken from the country of origin to a different 
country and enriched there, and both countries contractually 
implement prior consent regulations with respect to the recipient 
state. 
The agreement with Australia subjects all transfer of material 
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to third states to an approval proviso on the part of Australia 
(Art. IX), "the same is true of relations with Canada /3.11/. 
With respect to the enrichment of ur.anium supplied, both 
agreements differentiate between enrichment to above or below 
20 %. Enrichment to more than 20 % requires the approval 
of the supplier country /3.12/. It is ägreed in both contracts 
that particular arrangements will be made about conditions 
under which such enrichment can take place. Publications 
with respect to this have apparently not yet appeared. 
In both agreements reprocessing is similarly subject to ob-
ligatory approval /3.13/. Canada authorized reprocessing 
after the EEC had disclosed its current and planned nuclear 
energy programme to Canada in accordance with Item 2E. This 
includes the detailed description of political, legal and 
statutory elements concerning reprocessing anq plutonium 
storage and utilization. The EEC must in future inform Canada 
of modifications to all data contained in this description; 
Canada will reexamine its authorization with each change. 
The agreement does not specify in detail those modified con-
ditions under which authorization can be withdrawn. 
In this connection it is remarkable that in Item 4 of the 
Canadian agreement the EEC is even contractually committed 
to "special measures necessary for separation, storage, transport 
and utilization of plutonium''; among these is also an "effective 
and internationally accepted international system of plutonium 
storage". 
In the Australian agreement, requirements on the admissibility 
of reprocessing are laid down in Appendix C. Art. 1 Item. a 
determines reprocessing for the purpese of utilizing the 
energy content or management. Such reprocessing is conditional 
upon a certain nuclear fuel cycle programme. This is apparently 
described in an executive order unpublished to date. 
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In this respect the agreement follows the Canadian pattern; 
admissibility of reprocessing is coupled to the fuel cycle 
in question, authorization being granted for the current 
cycle. 
Art. 1b of the Appendix envisages storage of the separated 
plutonium under IAEA safeguards. Finally, Art. 1c determines 
that special authorization becomes necessary for reprocessing 
if this is to serve purposes other than those mentioned in 
Item a. 
The agreement with Australia also records (admittedly only 
in the preamble) the desire of the parties to demand an "effective 
and generally acceptable international system of plutonium 
storage". 
The 1963 agreement between EURATOM and the United States 
of America, the revision of which is demanded by the NNPA, still 
currently remains unchanged in the field under discussion 
here. •dmittedly, it cannot be ruled out that a new understanding 
on the future nature of the agreement will be achieved before 
long. In this context it is of significance that the US State 
Department made known in a statement of 9th June, 1982 /3.14/ 
that nuclear cooperation will in future not be completely 
excluded even for those states which reprocess spent materials. 
The statement says: "··. the President has decided that in 
certain cases, the United States will offer to werk out pre-
dictable, programmatic arrangements for reprocessing and 
plutonium use for civilian power and research needs, in the 
context of seeking near or amended agreements as required 
by law". The statement said that thus under certain NP require-
ments, it was possible to cooperate with states with "advanced 
nuclear power programs". Finally, it is also expressly emphasized 
that the USA no langer requires its consent in each individual 
case for every uranium shipment, but rather that approval 
can now be generally given for "specific, carefully defined 
programs". As a result it can therefore be expected that 
in its future contractual practice the USA will seek settlements 
similar in pattern to the EURATOM agreements with Canada 
and Australia. 
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If one puts the two agreements and the currently ernerging 
position of the USA in the context of recent international 
discussions of international nuclear policy then it immediately 
becomes apparent that they have the nature of a compromise. 
The international prohibition of reprocessing and enrichment, 
which had been discussed for a time on the part of the supplier 
countries, could not be contractually implemented. On the 
other hand one must not fail to realize that quite considerable 
further development in international contractual practice 
can be seen in these agreements. There is a clearly visible 
tendency in both agreements for the supplier state to make 
the admissibility of reprocessing conditional upon the current 
state of the nuclear energy programme and details of the 
fuel cycle programme. Viewed globally, this pattern of regulation 
enables supplier countries to differentiate with respect 
to the admissibility of reprocessing depending on the require-
ments of the recipient country in question. This approach 
implies a rejection of the attitude that all recipient states 
have to be subjected to the same criteria with the same result 
for reasons of non-discrimination, irrespective of their 
energy requirements and their special situation. 
It can currently be assumed that the supplier states concerned 
will retain their authorization stipulations in the near 
future; namely, this prior consent represents in many respects 
the basic principle of national regulations concerning the 
expert of sensitive materials and facilities. There is much 
evidence that the practice described above will only change 
if common approaches are internationally developed which 
could make the implementation of the one-sided national con-
ceptions of the supplier countries partially or completely 
irrelevant. 
3.5 International Nuclear Policy Through National Legislation: 
A Brief Evaluation of the NNPA 
From its very beginning the nuclear policy of the United 
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States of America can be characterized by the "parallelism 
and competition" of multilateral agreements and unilateral, 
national measures established in it. 
The USA's At~ms for Peace initiative was supplemented by 
the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) instigated by the USA. Its competence has, however, 
been limited by national American legislation. Moreover, 
security agreements between the USA and its allies competed 
with the NP treaty. 
This procedural parallelism became a problern for the inter-
national credibility of the USA when the USA comprehensively 
determined its internal and external nuclear policy by national 
legislation (NNPA) and at the same time demanded international 
negotiations on an international system inhibiting proliferation 
(INFCE). 
This parallel approach can be evaluated as an expression 
of the fact that the United States is aware of its opportunities 
for exercising global influence, but that it does not want 
to recognize the dependence of its nuclear policy on changes 
and shifts in emphasis on the international nuclear scenario. 
Wolf Häfele formulated it as follows: "It must be acknowledged 
that the USA, consciously or unconsciously, continuously 
reverted to the position on which the conception of the IAEA 
was originally based: pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy under the primacy and control of the USA" /3.15/. 
America's constant attempt to restrictively determine the 
international nuclear system single-handedly culminated in 
the NNPA (one of its main instruments, prior consent, is 
dealt with in 3.4 above). 
Even if the Reagan Administration handles the tools of the 
NNPA more pragmatically and flexibly in its programme, nevertheless 
the legal apparatus still remains and could at any time offer 
a new administration a means for more literal application. 
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3.6 Threshold Countries and Non-Proliferation System 
Political and economic considerations of reducing their energy 
dependence and placing their energy economy·on a broader 
basis are in the forefront for the threshold countries of 
the Third World in deciding on utilizing nuclear energy. 
In the same way as most of the industrialized states the , 
threshold countries have not achieved this objective to the 
envisaged extent. 
Within the framewerk of the international non-proliferation 
discussion, the threshold Countries of the Third World are 
of the opinion that nuclear export policy since the mid-seventies 
in the form of unilateral conditions going beyond the NPT 
has placed the supplier countries in a position to exert 
influence on national energy programmes. This view is put 
forward both by countries who are signatories to the NPT 
as well as those who are not. 
It has become apparent that some nuclear threshold countries 
in the Third World are technically and economically in a 
position to develop and realize their own nuclear programmes 
in the lang term. Their desire to curtail the construction 
phase with the aid of western industrialized states does 
not, however, by any means reflect a willingness to accept 
unlimited NP restrictions again. 
All threshold countries demand the unhampered development 
of national programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
This is considered as an important, almost symbolic, indicator 
of the state of their technological and economic development 
for these countries, and as an expression of national sover-
eignty. 
Whereas a number of threshold countries are prepared to accept 
the NPT regulations as boundary conditions for their own 
nuclear policy, those threshold powers in the Third World 
who already currently have an advanced nuclear programme 
at their disposal reject their inclusion in this Treaty system. 
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Seme of these states are prepared to subject their nuclear 
facilities to international safeguards in order to thus document 
the exclusively peaceful uses of their facilities. These 
international safeguards are not acceptable to other threshold 
countries. They thus cast doubt upon the development of an 
international non-proliferation system. With the conclusion 
of INFCE, a new concept was introduced into the international 
nuclear discussion with "Institutional Models''· According 
to their definition, they comprise a large number of possi-
bilities for cooperation - for example intergovernmental 
agreements, technical research and support programmes, inter-
national, regional and multinational institutions. 
The objective of the technology-holding states in CAS and 
PUNE will have to be to offer the threshqld countries solutions 
which increase proliferation barriers by deterrent or pre-
ventative measures, but which on the other hand improve and 
ensure the assurance of supply with nuclear materials, facilities 
and technologies to the same extent. 
3.7 Committee on Assurance of Supply (CAS) 
The Committee on Assurance of Supply was convened as a working 
committee by the Board of Governors of the IAEA after the 
conclusion ·of INFCE in 1980. All members of the IAEA can 
participate. 
The CAS mandate assumes that supply assurance and non-prolif-
eration cannot be considered and treated separately. The 
task of the CAS is therefore to werk out clear, long-range 
terms of trade for supply assurance. 
Nearly 50 states take part in the CAS proceedings. They represent 
almest all supplier and recipient states involved in trade 
with nuclear materials. This fact alone makes the CAS a qualified 
forum for an international exchange of views on the connection 
between the supply assurance and non-proliferation. Due to 
the broad. spectrum of the CAS (supplier and recipient states, 
- 39 -
members and non-members of NPT, industrialized and developing 
countries) rapid progress and results cannot be expected, 
A positive aspect is that the CAS has been relatively free 
of north-south conflicts and has not been drawn in to the 
violent disputes of the past few IAEA general conferences 
either. 
The following list summarizes statements on institutional 
measures as formulated by the states represented in the CAS 
in the opening session. 
The left side of the Table assigns the participant states 
to military alliances, economic federations and non-proliferation 
arrangements. 
On the right side are the institutional measures supported 
by the individual states (for IPS (1), for back-up arrangements 
(2), for a fuel bank (3), for regional or multinational fuel 
cycle facilities (4)), attitudes to safeguards and supply 
assurance (supply assurance complementary to NP conditions 
(5), safeguards only in the case of supply assurance (6), 
criticism of the suppliers' policy according to the London 
Guidelines (7)), to guaranteed access to technology (8) and 
to the application of full-scope safeguards. Columns (10) 
and (11) list the developing countries with advanced nuclear 
technologies and those just beginning to apply nuclear tech-
nologies. 
3.8 International Conference for the Promotion of International 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE) 
Within the framewerk of the United Nations, this Conference 
for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy was demanded especially by the threshold 
and developing countries, but also by the non-aligned states. 
PUNE will not take place as envisaged in Geneva the late 
summer of 1983, but rather only in 1984. The objective of 
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the Conference is to analyse the status and future of nuclear 
technology in all spheres of application. The main priority 
will be on problems of cooperation and support for the developing 
countries from the industrialized nations. In the committee 
preparing for the Conference various parties requested the 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy to be treated in 
all possible areas of application, beginning wi~h energy 
generation, applications in agriculture and biology, up to 
medical uses. 
It is to be expected that PUNE (like most UN conferences) 
~ill be strongly characterized by north-south problems. The 
developing countries will probably place the emphasis on 
whether the industrialized nations have complied with their 
demands in transferring sufficient know-how on nuclear tech-
nology, nuclear material and equipment. 
The course and results of PUNE will undoubtedly be of signif-
icance as a halfway house before the next conference reviewing 
the NP Treaty. 
Due to the wide spectrum of problems, it is also to be expected 
that aspects will be mentioned previously treated within 
the IAEA framework, especially in the Committee on Assurance 
of Supply. 
Various delegations have therefore expressed the desire during 
preparatory sessions for PUNE that the IAEA should contribute 
to the programrne both in the preparations as well as at the 
conference. The fact that on the fringe of CAS sessions the 
PUNE prograrnrne has been regularly mentioned in conversations 
between the threshold countries and industrialized nations 
would seern to favour such a procedure. 
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3.9 Inte~im Results 
The course of the preceding deliberations has resulted in 
a complex picture with ~espect to the stability of international 
mechanisms for preventing horizontal proliferation. The starting 
point is the realization that the international community 
has so far unde~taken - particularly within the f~amework 
of the NPT and the IAEA Statute - considerable, in many respects 
even unique, efforts in this field. The special feature of 
the current situation is that previous results continue to 
be very differently evaluated in the global context by important 
protagonists. Whe~eas the industrialized nations supplying 
uranium, under the aegis of the USA, are pressing fo~ an 
intensification of previously created mechanisms, countries 
in the Third World particularly significant from an NP point 
of view consider the previous mechanisms too rigo~ous and 
thus unreasonable. This stage of development makes it obvious 
that the sea~ch for novel forms of international cooperation 
will have to be intensified in future. The objective of these 
efforts will have to be the inclusion in new concepts on 
the one hand of different demands for effective NP measu~es 
and on the othe~ hand of supply assurance. Primarily f~om 
this perspective has the idea of "Institutional Models" been 
considered and recommended in the INFCE. The definition of 
these models as well as thei~ possible practical form has 
not yet been conclusively discussed, but in view of present 
tensions in international nuclea~ regulations they will require 
closer consideration in future. 
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4. STATUS OF DISCUSSION FOR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
The subsequent activities in connection with the INFCE nego-
tiations, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the USA, resulted in various suggestions in the field of 
international nuclear cooperation as measures for hindering 
proliferation, complementary to international safeguards. 
It was presumed that the danger of proliferation emanated 
in the first place from activities in the reprocessing and 
enrichment sectors, which the important industrialized states 
did not want to dispense with, in spite of the vote of the 
then US Government, with a view to assuring their energy 
supply. 
However, it has in the meantime appeared that particularly 
in the back-end sector two sets of problems need to be treated 
on a priority basis. These are the interim storage of spent 
fuel elements and the storage of separated plutonium. 
Two basic papers on international cooperation models are 
introduced in the following, an American and a German study, 
insofar as they are relevant for the further institutional 
developments to be discussed in Chapter 5. After this con-
siderable attention is paid to the description and evaluation 
of the present status of discussions on the International 
Plutonium Storage System (IPS). The present Chapter closes 
with a brief description of the state of discussions on the 
international management of spent fuel elements from nuclear 
power stations (ISFM). 
4.2 The CUSTODY Model 
On the part of the USA, an approach for international nuclear 
cooperation was investigated in a study /4.1/ which at first 
sight seems to have great similarities with the objectives 
of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). In the 
following this cooperation model is compared with EURATOM. 
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In evaluating the study and the "custody authority" suggested 
in it, it is of essential signi!icance that the operating 
state should only be able to remove sensitive material from 
the plants with the approval of the autho~ity. Preconditions 
for this approval are to be previously determined. The authority 
should therefore also verify that after granting approval 
t~e material is used in accordance with the specifications 
given to the authority by the operatin~ state. 
The study avoids delineating the release criteria in detail. 
It is merely said that this will involve "one-time release 
based on end use". Moreover, the study explicitly leaves 
the question unanswered of whether particular types of appli-
cation for sensitive material (such as reutilization of plutonium 
in light-water reactors) should generally be excluded from 
the envisaged model. 
Correspondence of the Custody Model with the EURATOM 
Structures 
1. Regionalization of NP Efforts 
A basic concept of the custody model is the ~ttempt 
to regionalize efforts at non-proliferation of atomic 
weapons. This concept of effectively assuring international 
agreements by intensified cooperation within a homogeneaus 
group of states is actually realized by EURATOM. 
2. Complementary Safeguards by IAEA and Regional Organization 
A further important parallel between the custody model 
and EURATOM results in that both systems envisage safeguards 
measures by the regional organization. These safeguards 
are conceived of as complementary to those of the IAEA 
and are not mutually exclusive. 
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3. Proprietary Rights of the Regional Organization to Sensitive 
Material 
In the custody model it is admittedly not regarded as 
necessary, but nevertheless as desirable, that ownership 
of sensitive material should not be allocated to the 
national operator, but rather to the international custody 
authority still to be created. Art. 86 of the treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM 
Treaty) allocates ownership of special fissionable materials 
to the European Atomic Energy Community; the plant operators 
only have unrestricted rights of utilization and consumption 
(Art. 87 EURATOM Treaty). 
4. Objectives of the Regional Organization 
A difference between the two models can be seen in the 
differently formulated objectives. The custody model 
is concerned with an effective non-proliferation policy. 
The aim of EURATOM is a common market in the nuclear 
energy sector; non-proliferation aspects forming an 
important component, but not being the only major priority. 
The activities of EURATOM (at least in its present legal 
form) thus refer to all phases of the fuel cycle, including 
for example contractual relations in acquiring nuclear 
material. However, this difference alone would not be 
decisive if the question were merely whether EURATOM 
fulfilled the conditions of the custody model in the 
field of NP structures. 
5. Permanent Safeguards on Sensitive Material 
The custody model requires permanent safeguards on sensitive 
material. Such far-reaching safeguards are not mandatory 
in the EURATOM Treaty, neither are they currently realized. 
Pursuant to Art. 81 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Commission 
dispatches inspectors to the member states. The inspectors 
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examine whether the materials are being used in accordance 
with the states' declarations and pertinent responsibili-
ties under international law. The inspectors have "access 
at any time to all locations, documents and persans 
who for reasons of their profession are involved with 
substances, items of equipment or facilities subject 
(pursuant to the EURATOM Treaty) to safeguards". This 
is implemented if "necessary for safeguarding ores, 
source materials and special fissionable materials, 
and to determine whether the previsiens of Art. 77 are 
being observed". If these regulations are not observed 
by a member state then the Community can apply compulsory 
measures (Art. 83). For example, seurce materials or 
fissionable materials can be completely or partially 
withdrawn from the state. 
The EURATOM safeguards are based in detail upen the 
fact that the operator, pursuant to Art. 78 of the EURATOM 
Treaty, must supply the Commission with basic technical 
features of the plant (design infermatien), insefar 
as they are of significance for the Commission's safeguards 
function. Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 79, lists must 
be compiled and presented for sensitive materials accountancy; 
this also refers to the transport of sensitive materials. 
These responsibilities are determined in detail by an 
executive order of 28 May, 1959 /4.2/. In this connection 
attentien must also be drawn to the fact that pursuant 
to Art. 80 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Commission can 
demand that "all excess special fissionable materials 
recovered er preduced as bypreducts and not actually 
used er made available fer use must be deposited at 
the European Supply Agency or in other stores subject 
or accessible to Commission safeguards". A consistent real-
ization of this standard could in practice lead to the member 
states only being in possession of "non-excess" material, 
i.e. that the subject of the actual safeguards would 
only be those materials immediately required for operating 
the present plants. If one also considers that the 
access rights 
formulated in 
this is still 
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of the EURATOM inspectors are very broadly 
Art. 81 of the EURATOM Treaty, then admittedly 
not a permanent safeguards model in the 
sense of the custody suggestion, but nevertheless, the 
differences no longer appear basic. The inspection effort 
is determined relatively flexibly in Art. 8~ of the 
EURATOM Treaty; "insofar as this is required for safe-
guards". Without necessarily modifying the Treaty this 
formulation would permit an increase in inspection activity 
which would in effect approach permanent safeguards. 
6. Release Criteria 
There is a difference between the two models with respect 
to compiling so-called release criteria, which are to 
determine conditions for the release of sensitive material 
from the international authority to the operator. The 
custody model presumes that certain forms of utilization 
for sensitive material are not to be permitted. The 
safeguards approach in EURATOM is different; pursuant 
to Art. 77a of the EURATOM Treaty the object of safeguards 
is "that the ores, the source materials and special 
fissionable materials shall not be used for purposes 
other than those specified by their users". Moreover, 
pursuant to Art. 77b, EURATOM safeguards the responsibilities 
which the Community has undertaken with a third state 
or an intergovernmental institution. The EURATOM Treaty 
itself does not therefore in effect place any limitation 
on the use of fissionable materials. These limitations 
result from decisions made by the member states themselves 
and from external treaties. 
Nevertheless, a general evaluation of the existence 
of EURATOM must also include the actual situation. The 
t t · EURATOM do not possess non-nuclear-weapons s a es ~n 
any uranium reserves of their own. They are therefore 
f th ird states and dependent on supplies of uranium rom 
have thus in the past few decades also been dependent on 
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the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as agreed in the 
supply contracts. Particularly with respect to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, it must be noted that t~e latter 
is restricted to peaceful uses since it bind~ngly committed 
itself to this under international law in 1954. 
Regarded as a whole, the EURATOM Treaty creates a dynamic 
system which guarantees the conversion of valid inter-
national responsibilities by meatis of EURATOM safeguards. 
Release criteria have apparently not yet been agreed 
in supply contracts, for this reason no corresponding 
safeguards yet take place within the EURATOM framework. 
If this aspect of the situation under international 
law should change in future then EURATOM safeguards 
could be, and indeed would have tobe, adjusted to this 
new situation. 
In conclusion, it can be established here that the custody 
model currently goes beyend EURATOM safeguards in this 
respect, by including additional elements from an IPS 
in the model. Nothing stands in the way of a future 
change in EURATOM structure in the sense of the custody 
model. Furthermore, Art. 80 of the EURATOM Treaty must 
also be mentioned here for the potential development 
of EURATOM, according to which the Community has the 
right to keep excess fissionable materials in its own 
stores. Implementation of this regulation in practice 
would require a definition of "excess". At the same 
time this would institutionally question the way in 
which separation of excess and non-excess material could 
be ensured. In this context the question would also 
have to be answered of the concrete circumstances under 
which material stored as "excess" by EURATOM could be 
released. 
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4.3 The KFA Approach 
The approach suggested on the part of the Federal Republic 
/4.3/ for nuclear cooperation models aimed at hindering prolif-
eration differentiates between national* and international 
forms of cooperation. Various forms of organization of a 
national character were defined according to the increase 
in commitments under international law: 
The initial model only envisages membership of the NP 
Treaty with the resulting cooperation with and controls 
on the part of the IAEA as the single international 
component. The nuclear plant is operated on a purely 
national basis. 
As an additional commitment under international law, 
membership of the operator state in EURATOM is stipulated 
for the second model. Unrestricted utilization rights 
to nuclear material thus exist, but not proprietary 
rights. EURATOM carries out safeguards in the same way 
as the IAEA. Member states are bound to EURATOM for 
an indefinite period and their membership is in principle 
not terminable. 
Operation of a national plant takes place with financial 
participation as well as service rights of a third state, 
which for its part would not operate any plants.: 
Anational plant is, pursuant to approval under inter-
national law, permanently operated by a multinational 
operating staff. 
A national plant has a permanent multinational management 
(with purely national operating staff). 
* Allocation to a national legal system 
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In the case of multinational enterprises, the rights 
to the plants are distributed between several ptivate 
or national legal entities, which for their part have 
been founded according to and beleng to various national 
legal systems. The essential aspect is whether the goal 
and structure of the enterprise can be changed in substance 
by a revision in the private law of the hast country, 
or whether it is established in a treaty under international 
law between the states concerned. 
The national cooperation model with the highest degree 
of internationalization consists of a multinational 
concern renouncing under international law the exercise 
of certain sovereign rights in the local area of the 
plant, as well as the obligatiQn only to amend the pertinent 
laws with the consent of the signatory partners. The 
operating state could then no langer nationalize the 
plant without violating international law. 
With respect to constructing models with international organ-
ization, studies have led to the following results: 
The law applicable to an international organization is character-
ized by an independent memorandum of association under inter-
national law, in which legal relations are determined between 
the international organization and the hast state. The associated 
heightened legal independence of international organization 
diminishes the danger of the legislative argans of the operating 
state changing the pertinent law to the disadvantage of third-
party states. The purpose, essential objectives, organs, 
duration, periods of notice and procedural regulations can 
be determined in the memorandum of association. 
The following can be considered as possible variants of the 
law applicable for international organizations: 
international organization without any renouncement 
of sovereign rights on the part of the hast state, 
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international organization with renouncement of sovereign 
rights on the part of a host state, 
international organization on extraterritorial soil. 
In the case of an international organization founded for 
the purposes of reprocessing or enriching nuclear material, 
the following must be specifically established: 
budget 
objectives of the organization in the research and develop-
ment sector 
. 
issues of technology transfer 
responsibilities of the member states, especially in 
relation to third states. 
The enormaus costs to be raised for the plant operated by 
the international organization force the member states to 
dispense with flexibility and commit themselves to a guaranteed 
long-term plan of several decades. In effect, this means 
that a member state must commit itself for budgetary reasons 
to an energy policy, at least in the medium term. 
In order to prevent further proliferation and development 
of sensitive technology in the member states, as well as 
to improve efficient operation of the plants, the international 
organization must cornpile its own comprehensive development 
programrne for the whole range of the technologically required 
plants. Far-reaching consequences thus result for the private 
sector which can lead to a general prohibition of certain 
types of research, or at least to considerable restrictions. 
Moreover, renouncernent of every type of reprocessing and 
enrichment would have to be among the obligations of the 
member states. The exclusive operation of sensitive plants 
by the international organization raises problems with respect 
to existing plants and the legal status of nuclear weapons 
states. The economic, scientific and political consequences 
of an unequal treatment of weapons and non-weapons states 
in this field must be considered. 
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It has become apparent that international organizations raise 
problems of realization and implementation for sensitive 
plants in the nuclear fuel cycle - enrichment, reprocessing, 
MOX refabrication plants - which are difficult to solve for 
a number of reasons and thus should stand down in practical 
discussions. For national models, the model of a multinational 
concern on the basis of international law with a renouncement 
of certain sovereign rights seems best to correspond to the 
various criteria with a certain priority for bindering prolif-
eration. Due to its basic structures, this model permits 
such flexibility in balancing the interests involved that 
it can be regarded in principle both as realistic and conforming 
to the fact in its approach for further discussions. However, 
it also became apparent that a national plant involved in 
themultiple contractual network of the NP Treaty and EURATOM 
and the associated safeguards and contractual conditions 
displays considerable advantages with respect to preventing 
proliferation in comparison to the model described above. 
4.4 International Plutonium Storage (IPS) /4.4/ 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The International Plutonium Storage System is an institutional 
measure in the sense of a further development of international 
nuclear material safeguards by the IAEA. The goal of the 
system is a reduction in the danger of proliferation which 
could result from the accumulation of plutonium under national 
control. The !PS system envisages a deposit of excess plutonium 
with the IAEA. It should be noted in this context that EURATOM 
has contractually bound itself towards Australia and Canada 
to support efforts at establishing an !PS (cf. comments on 
prior consent). The legal basis to this is Art. XII A.S, 
IAEA Statute. 
Approaches to the formation and implementation of an !PS 
system were worked out in a working group "!PS and Safeguards'', 
in which 33 countries were involved, as well as the IAEA and 
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EURATOM. Since the majority of participating states favour~d 
Alternative A, this alternative will be described and evaluated 
in order to study international cooperation models. Alternatives 
B and C are described in a collection of material appended 
to this study as a separate volume. 
4.4.2 Description of Alternative A 
(1) Ragistration 
All separated plutonium which is the property of a state 
and subject to IAEA safeguards is registered. Initial 
inventories are established at the point of accession to 
IPS. Information about inventories are brought up to 
date by inventory change reports. Conditions of ownership 
must be stated in detail. 
This procedure would enable the state to make use of 
plutonium immediately after separation and registration. 
To this end, the state must make a "statement of use" 
to the IAEA either before or after separation or in 
connection with registration (see Fig. 4-1, Flows 1 
and 2).· For plutoniumnot immediately used (Flow 3) 
the following steps are applicable. 
(2) Depositing and 
(3) Storage in an IPS store 
(4) Return 
Stored plutonium is promptly returned at the request 
of the owner state. This presumes a statement of use. 
(5) Use verification 
It is verified that the plutonium is used in accordance 
with the statement of use up to its deregistration. 
Use verification is applied whether the plutonium is 
used immediately after registration or whether this 
return after depositing and storage first ensues upon 
in an IPS store. 
Fig. 4-1 
ALTERNATIVE A 
REGISTRA TION . 
of separated plutonium 
USE 
VERIFICA TIOI':l 
OEREGISTRA TION 
Current Safeguards 
continua 
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(6) Deregistration 
Derigistration tak&s place as soon as plutonium is loaded 
into a reactor as fuel, or as soon as safeguards are 
terminated in accordance with the valid safeguards agree-
ment. 
(7) The valid safeguards measures ar~ to be applied to the 
steps described. 
4.4.3 Status of IPS Discussions 
The IAEA expert group on IPS has examined the technical and 
oparational possibilities. But the objective of making completely 
formulated approaches to the implementation of Art. XII A.5 
has not yet been achieved. The following steps still have 
to be taken: 
1) Agreement must be achieved about basic conceptional 
issues. 
2) After this, elements for concluding implementing agreements 
between the member states and the IAEA have to be drawn 
up. 
3) Elements for concluding agreements between member states 
and the IAEA ~n the designation and operation of IPS 
stores have to be drawn up. 
4) The application of procedures for implementing the agree-
ments mentioned above - e.g. in subsidiary arrangements -
must also be considered. 
4.4.4 Evaluation of Alternative A 
A set of basic procedures for implementing Art. XII A.5 of 
the IAEA Statute, are suggested in the IPS alternative A. 
Same of the envisaged regulations which are still disputed 
will be commented in the following. However, a commentary 
on some of the uncontested points will also be given. 
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Declaration of Plutonium 
In this problern area the disputed issue is whether a member 
state must declare all the separated plutonium of which it 
is the owner. That is to say also plutonium which is not 
within its sovereign territory and thus subject to the juris-
diction and control of a third state. For example, this other 
state may not be a member of either the IPS or the NPT, and 
not all its nuclear plants need be subject to IAEA safeguards. 
A declaration of separated plutonium on different sovereign 
territory can only be of significance for the IAEA if it 
can also verify this inventory. On the other band, this separated 
plutonium does not contribute to an accumulation of material 
in the IPS member state obliged to make declarations. The 
latter then has the possibility of establishing a source 
of supply for separated plutonium independent of the IPS 
system, if that is what it wants. 
In effect, it can be said that regulation of the declaration 
obligation with respect to separated plutonium in a third 
state should be abandoned for practical reasons of non-verifiability. 
Specification of Isotope Composition 
The possibility of a state also giving information about 
isotope composition in specifying its separated plutonium 
is not universally accepted since this information could 
influence return of the material to the state. 
In this connection, there is a contradiction to Art. XII A.S, 
IAEA Statute, according to which deposited material must 
be immediately returned on application for (peaceful) utilization 
according to specification. The immediate return of the deposited 
separated plutonium can therefore not be refused on the grounds 
of the isotope composition. 
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"Principle of Territorial Responsibility" 
Advocates of Alternatiye A have also concerned themselves 
with the question of wpich state is responsible for depositing 
excess plutonium: (1) the state on whose territory the material 
is (although this state need not be the owner of the material), 
or (2) the state which is the owner of the excess plutonium. 
All advocates of Alternative A, except one, tend towards 
the secend opinion. The first view is discussed under the 
term ''principle of territorial responsibility". The question 
is the extent to which this principle can be derived from 
Art. XII A.S, IAEA Statute, and which consequences result 
for the owner of the material. 
As far as the first question is concerned, it must be said 
that Art. XII A.S does not specify which state is responsible 
for depositing excess material. The wording of the article 
merely indicates that the IAEA has the right to demand deposition 
from all states who have requested implementation of IAEA 
safeguards. 
If the state on whose territory the plutonium is present 
is not the owner of the material then the following aspects 
resuit: The material is included in the account of the state 
on whose territory it is. If the agreed buffer quantities 
are exceeded then plutonium must be deposited. If the princip!e 
of territorial responsibility is valid then the state can 
deposit foreign plutonium in order to retain its own material 
as a buffer. The owner state would then have to make an appli-
cation for return to the IAEA in order to obtain its plutonium 
again. On the other band, there is also admitted!y the possi-
bility that the. state on whose territory the excess is located 
could send foreign material back to the owners in order to 
keep its own excess amounts small. It is assumed that the 
owner of the plutonium in principle wants to have his material 
at his own disposal. The principle of territorial responsibility 
would therefore amount to an unacceptable disenfranchisement 
of the owner state. 
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Determination of Excess Amounts 
An essential point of the IPS system concerns the issue of 
determining excess amounts which are exempted from depositing. 
This is due to the problern that a process plant cannot be 
operated normally without a certain material reserve. For 
this reason an acceptable IPS system must exempt excess plutonium 
for such purposes from depositing obligations. The disputed 
issue is whether this amount of material should be determined 
relative to the whole state or the individual plant. 
It is uneentestad that the exempted amount must be oriented 
towards the detection goals of IAEA safeguards*. From the 
point of view of the safeguards authority there is undoubtedly 
a great deal in favour of the opinion that the exempted quantity 
should be related to the whole state. Presuming a state support-
ing a nuclear energy programme with closure of the fuel cycle 
(20 GW criterion), then it has an indispensable necessity 
and right to operate its plants without hindrance. For this 
reason the exempted amount must also be related to the plant 
capacity. This certainly requires determination of an exempted 
amount of a size which, depending on the development of the 
fuel cycle, far exceeds the threshold quantity. Determination 
according to the first alternative (reference of the exempted 
quantity to the whole state) seems to be hardly practicable 
after the preceding reference to the IAEA detection goals. 
On the other hand, the secend alternative which envisages 
referring the exempted quantity to the individual plant tends 
rather to conform to current safeguards practice. Namely 
for technical reasons, the IAEA must actually refer its detection 
goals to the individual material balance areas until further 
provision is made. The determination of a permitted excess 
amount per plant would thus both fit in with current safeguards 
practice and also enable the operator to operate the plant 
largely unhindered since he can always retain sufficient 
working material. 
* The current threshold quantity for Pu is 8 kg. 
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In _addition there is the controversial suggestion that in 
connection with the secend alternative the total excess plutonium 
in a plant should be deposited as soon as the agreed exemption 
quantity is exceeded. This type of regulation would inevitably 
lead to operational obstructions. In any case, the administrative 
efforts of the IAEA on the one hand and the operator on the 
other hand would be increased. An operator who was forced 
to deposit all his reserves of excess plutonium would have 
to simultaneously cope with the depositing formalities as 
well as the return formalities for that part of the material 
exempted from depositing according to the agreement. Unjustified 
additional burdens would thus result especially for the IAEA. 
If the material is physically transported to and fro then 
there are also unjustified burdens in the fields of operational 
safety a~d physical protection. 
The real problems of an IPS system, which has the goal of 
preventing an accumulation of plutonium in a single state, 
are in principle to be found in determining the exempted 
amounts. Grientation towards the threshold quantity of 8 kg 
is here in conflict with the right to unhindered plant Operation. 
On a commercial scale of the fuel cycle, buffer quantities 
are required which just do not seem reconcilable with the 
goal of depositing proliferation-relevant amounts of Pu with 
the IAEA. 
St~te Responsibility 
If one assumes that a state has its own and foreign plutonium 
to be declared on its sovereign territory, then the following 
situation could result with respect to depositing. An excess 
of plutonium is formed on the state's territory. Insofar 
as foreign plutonium is also involved, the state must call 
in the foreign owner(s). The latter, if they were unable 
to make a statement of use, would have to release the material 
f ·s made then the material for depositing. If a statement o use ~ 
concerned would have to be transferred to the owner state. 
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These regulations enable the owner of the plutonium to exeroise 
complete responsibility for his material. 
Time Frame 
The time limits within which the IAEA must reply to an application 
for return, and possibly to clarify further enquiries must 
be seen in relation to the question of buffer-stock limits. 
In general it can be said that the size of the buffer-stock 
limits must be proportional to the period of time to which 
the IAEA is entitled for dealing with return formalities. 
A period of one to two months must be assumed. The time elapsing 
after the application for return has been made before the 
material is actually returned is approximately identical 
to the period estimated for processing the application. 
Verification of Pu Use 
The significance of determining IAEA's effort at achieving 
the IPS goal (verification that no stockpiling is taking 
place) is not clear. The assertion that this goal could be 
achieved by applying valid safeguards practice or with very 
sl~ght additional efforts in the safeguards authority are 
very difficult to verify in advance anyway. Nevertheless, 
the authors are of the opinion that certain additional efforts 
in the safeguards authority will have to be expected over 
and above current safeguards practice. 
4.4.5 Compatability of an IPS System with the Obligation 
of State Safe-Keeping Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act 
(AtG); Storage of Material from Third State~ 
From the point of view of the law in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, establishment of an IPS in Germany would raise 
legal problems especially with respect to the implementation 
of § 5 AtG; in Par. 1 sentence 1 of this regulation it is 
stipulated that nuclear fuels are to be "deposited with the 
state". 
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The organizational solution envisaged in Alternative A could 
not be regarded as "state safe-keeping". This type of depositing 
can only be established if governmental ergans of the Federal 
Republic of Germany are exclusively responsible for safe-keeping. 
It would therefore depend on whether exemption could be granted 
pursuant to § 6 AtG for the establishment of an IPS. The 
first prerequisite for this pursuant to § 6 would be whether 
there were any ''need" for the establishment of an IPS in 
_the sense of the regulation. It has n~t been necessary up 
to now to definitively clarify the conditions under which 
such ''need" could be assumed. A case mentioned in the establish-
ment of the AtG (preamble to the draft of an AtG, sentence 22) 
concerns storage in the vicinity of a reactor in order to 
ensure continuous operation and to reduce transport problems. 
Whether accession of the Federal Republic to an IPS system 
could also create a "need" does not seem quite clear. This 
could be opposed by stating that governmental safe-keeping 
should be the rule pursuant to the AtG and exemptions - in 
accordance with a general interpretation - should only be 
granted under restricted conditions. On the other band, it 
must be pointed out that in the determination of the objectives 
of the AtG it is said in § 1 that the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy are to be furthered, that the protective purpese of 
the law is to be regarded as internal and external security 
and that the AtG also serves to fulfill international obli-
gations. If such a situation were then to result in which, 
according to widespread opinion, establishment of an IPS 
system could be regarded as a means for ensuring the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, then the view could be put forward 
that a ''need'' in the sense of § 6 AtG would arise. Attention 
could also be drawn to the fact that Art. XII A 5 of the 
IAEA Statute represents in principle an obligation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the sense of § 1 AtG. In effect, 
good reasons could thus be put forward for the existence 
of a "need'' in the sense of § 6 AtG in establishing an IPS. 
Admittedly, such a statement cannot yet be made in view of 
the current development of the law. 
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If one p~esumes the existence of a "need'' in the sense of 
§ 6 AtG, then the further prerequisites for granting _an exemption 
would have to be examined. The Federal Republic, pur~uant 
to Par. 2 Sub-par. 1, would have to examine whether ~hose 
persans entrusted with implementing the IPS could be considered 
"reliable" and in possession of the necessary specialized 
knowledge. Furthermore, it would have to be established whether 
the IPS regulation concerning "necessary precautions against 
darnage according to the state of science and technology" 
would be appli~able (§ 6 Par. 2 Sub-par. 2). Moreover, it 
would be of particular significance that the IAEA would take 
on obligations concerning liability: Par. 2 Sub-par. 3 only 
permits granting of approval if provision has been made for 
the implementation of legal Obligations concerning compensation 
for damages (cf. § 13 AtG). Finally, the IAEA would have 
to ensure protection against disturbances from third parties 
(Par. 2 Sub-par. 4). 
The required prerequisites could only be fulfilled as a whole 
if the Federal Republic were to conclude a treaty with the 
IAEA which would contractually determine in detail the points 
mentioned in the sense of § 6 AtG. However, it would have 
to be examined whether the IAEA has the necessary cornpetence 
to conclude such an agreement on the basis of its current 
statute. 
Finally, it would have to be noted that the establishment 
of an IPS on the Federal Republic's territory would have 
to consider its obligations under the EURATOM Treaty. It 
must be particularly noted that the Cornmission can demand 
pursuant to Art. 80 of the EURATOM Treaty that all excess 
special fissionable materials recovered or produced as byproducts 
and not actually used or made available for use be deposited 
with the EURATOM supply agency or in other stores. For this 
reason, an IPS agreement would require consent from the re-
sponsible EURATOM organs. It is interesting to note that 
EURATOM rights only refer to materials produced in the member 
states; material from third countries is acco~dingly not 
affected by these rights. 
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4.5 International Spent Fuel Management (ISFM) /4.6i 
At the initiative of the IAEA General Director, a group of 
experts from 24 countries and three international organizations 
first met in 1979. The objective of the group was to analyse 
the potential for international cooperation in the management 
of spent fuel elements with the goal of supporting the IAEA 
in solving this problern connected with the growing stockpiling 
of spent fuel elements. To this end, a series of techniques 
was identified by the group on the basis of which national , 
regional or multinational storage facilities should be possible. 
Several of these techniques are already established, others 
are still under development. 
The group came to th~ conclusion that arrangements for multi-
national spent fuel element stores could indeed be of interest 
for some countries, but that national stores for fuel elements 
from exclusively domestic nuclear energy utilization represent 
the most probable solution for the near future. There are, 
however, a number of measures for national stores which could 
alleviate the management of spent fuel elements. These measures 
could be of assistance both for countries with national pro-
grammes as well as those involved in multinational cooperation. 
Among these are for example appropriate improvements in guide-
lines and standards, technical support as well as technical 
information in the field of spent fuel element management. 
Both the IAEA and the NEA-OECD can play an important part 
in this sector. It can moreover be presumed that those countries 
with a genuine interest in applying international arrangements 
will enter into direct contact with each other. The IAEA 
and the NEA-OECD could provide support as a forum in negotiating 
international agreements. 
The ISFM Group recommends a step by step introduction of 
multinational arrangements as a meaningful approach. A possible 
initial step could be the availability of possibilities for 
back-up arrangements in emergency situations. A second step 
could be the establishment of new plants in which storage 
services for foreign partners could be undertaken. 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR THE BACK END OF THE NUCLEAR 
FUEL CYCLE 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking the perspectives drawn up in Chapter 2 for the world-wide 
application of nuclear engineering in supplying energy, certain 
problems are to be expected with respect to a suitable transfer 
of this sensitive technology. From this resulted on the one band 
the motivation to make the nuclear fuel cycle technically 
more resistant to proliferation, and on the other band to 
counteract aims of acquiring nuclear weapons with the aid 
of different forms of international cooperation in the field 
of nuclear energy. As a basis fo~ this, four discussion approaches 
were examined in the preceding Chapter. These approaches 
should now be elaborated. It will become apparent that these 
approaches arenot to be.considered as alternatives, but 
rather contain a number of elements to be developed which 
will be considered in one way or another in the following. 
The following assumptions must be made: 
In this respect international cooperation can supplement 
international nuclear material safeguards (e.g. in the sense 
of § 81 (d), INFCIRC/153); it can indeed even limit their extent 
and intensity. Proliferation is a political problern which 
is to be combated in this way by a combination of technical 
measures, for example in connection with accession to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Tlatelolco Treaty, and Obli-
gations based on cooperation agreements. 
However, the non-proliferation aspect cannot play the priority 
role which was originally assumed in the first considerations 
of institutional solutions. This problern will be dealt with 
in detail later. 
Nuclear cooperation does not appear equally attractive for 
every state. Besides nuclear material safeguards, a nuclear 
w~apons state is primarily concerned with safeguarding the 
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flow of know-how·and thus the possibility of influencing 
a non-nuclear-weapons state on a bilateral level. In this 
sense, a non-nuclear-weapons state which is already a technology 
holder cannot be influenced, except via the supply of nuclear 
material. It can thus already be seen that cooperation is 
most likely to arise if mutual dependence exists from the 
outset. In this way, a coupling of non-proliferation and 
supply guarantees results. Nevertheless, over and above these 
two basic aspects further criteria are also of significance 
in evaluating international cooperation. The contrary tendency 
is characteristic in the sense that, for example, national 
autarky is not of any value in hindering proliferation. 
The foreseeable world political situation is on the one hand 
characterized by the necessity of utilizing all available 
mechanisms for supplying energy, but on the other hand also 
indicates socially unstable and thus externally offensive 
states which endeavour to implement their goals by military 
means. The objective must be to develop forms of nuclear 
cooperation which are attractive for all states Operating 
nuclear facilities on the basis of equal treatment of the 
partners. However, a certain degree of discrimination. still 
remains since the exporting countries have already combined 
in the Lenden Club of Suppliers and observe certain agreements 
with respect to technology transfer and expert. From the 
point of view of proliferation, the decisive condition on 
the part of the exporting countries is that the importing 
countries must subject themselves to international nuclear 
material safeguards, at least for the imported plants and 
technologies. All nuclear cooperation will thus simultaneously 
involve NP regulations. 
The present Chapter deals especially with forms of cooperation 
for states at different stages of economic and technological 
development. The evaluation criteria used will be presented 
immediately after this Introduction. Whereas previous cooperation 
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between technology holders and recipient countries on the 
international nuclear market has largely been limited to 
the front end of the fuel cycle for practical considerations, 
it is becoming more and more obvious that compulsions to 
solve the issue of the back·end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
require that the back end be included in worldwide nuclear 
cooperation. Since the Federal Republic of Germany has an 
important part to play as a technology exporting country, 
the boundary conditions resulting from the German Atomic 
Energy Act will first be analysed. A reconception of inter-
national cooperation in the field of nuclear energy ought 
also to include this aspect. 
As significant stages in the back end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, the reprocessing of spent fuel elements, refabrication 
of fuel elements direct final disposal of spent fuel elements , 
as well as the final disposal of highly active waste from 
reprocessing are included in models for international Co-
operation. 
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5.2 Criteria for Evaluating. Models of Nuclear Cooperation 
A criteria catalogue comprising eleven criteria has been 
compiled as part of the KFA Jülich's basic werk on »Institutional 
Aspects of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" /5. 1/. A characteristic 
of these criteria is that they are in part correlated with 
each other. These criteria which stand alone are of a basic 
character. This is largely true of the criteria supply assurance 
and environmental protection. Political independence is, 
for example, based on supply assurance. Political acceptance 
refers to the latter, whereas social acceptance is largely 
determined by the guarantee of environmental protection. 
Hinderance of proliferation, as already mentioned, is thus 
a function of political independence. In this connection, 
it must be established that a state which desists from acquiring 
nuclear weapons is in a position of considerable political 
dependence with ~espect to the nuclear weapons states which, 
in the last analysis, can implement all their strategic and 
political ideas. In this respect, both NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact hinder proliferation by assigning defensive dependences. 
A loss of sovereignty on the part of the non-nuclear-weapons 
states within these alliances is compensated by a gain in 
power for the USA and the USSR. France and the United Kingdom 
are roughly in the middle. On the other hand, it must be 
assumed that even the suspicion of military nuclear activities 
on the part of one of the non-nuclear-weapons partners would 
trigger off immediate preventative measures from the opposing 
superpower. 
Supply assurance refers to the availability of raw materials, 
technologies, knowledge and services. To this extent it includes 
the criterion of planning assurance, which itself refers 
to assuring the future of the whole economy. This is then 
joined by the criterion of profitability. With respect to 
technologies and plants, the distribution of burdens and 
risks as well as economic operation at a certain size of 
plant plays a decisive role. Closely connected with this 
is, moreover, technology transfer which itself raises various 
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aspects. For reasons of proliferation, certain technological 
know-how should not be disseminated. The protection of commercial 
knowledge is aimed in the same direction. Conversely, tech-
nological development through technology transfer is the 
major issue for those states which are not yet technology 
holders. In general it can be said that knowledge gained 
in the field of nuclear technology can also partly be applied 
in other fields. Domestic promotion of technology also exists 
to this end. The criterion of vulnerability to sanctions 
depends on supply assurance. It can be said that a state 
is more vulnerable to sanctions, the more it depends on other 
states for its supply. In this respect there is once again 
a connection with bindering proliferation. 
In conclusion, an aspect is picked up again which has already 
been mentioned at the beginning: institutional models are 
I 
closely connected with international nuclear material safeguards. 
The· question of the safeguardability of nuclear plants thus 
arises. If problems should arise in this respect at certain 
plants, then this would inevitably have corresponding conse-
quences in decisions about the management. The more heavily 
a plant can be safeguarded by the controlling authorities, 
the more urgent would an international operating organization 
be for reasons of proliferation. The criterion of safeguard-
ability is therefore also included in order to permit a more 
comprehensive evaluation of proliferation hindrance. 
5.3 New Concepts of International Cooperation 
These considerations take as a starting point the fact that 
according to the current philosophy in the western countries, 
front-end services are also essentially ensured when exporting nuclear 
power stations. In the long term, this behaviour on the part 
of the exporters cannot be regarded as sufficiently responsible 
towards the recipient countries. Cooperation on a basis of 
trust between exporting and importing countries can rather 
be based both on an assured front end (supply of fuel) as 
- 70 -
well as assured management of spent fuel (storage of spent 
fuel elements, their reprocessing, plutonium recycling within 
an appropriate !PS system and possibly safe waste disposal). 
The complex technical problems, as well as the urgency with 
which the individual back-end steps have to be fulfilled 
in the various countries, only permit solutions which proceed 
in stages, staggered in time. Possible models for cooperation 
between countries importing and exporting nuclear plants 
must be adapted to this approach, by means of which technology 
transfer to the importing country is compacted in stages 
and, in the long term, leads to an independent back-end solution 
there. The export of nuclear power stations with front-end 
and back-end services in the field of storing fuel elements 
can thus be regarded as the first stage in a phased plan 
which will be presented in this study. It is obvious that 
the phased plan philosophy requires identical behaviour on 
the part of all supplier countries. 
In realizing a phased plan by the Federal Republic it must 
be stated that a back-end service by means of reprocessing 
is neither possible nor necessary yet. However, this plan 
requires medium-term planning, according to which it is estimated 
that this service capacity will possibly be desirable in 
about the year 2005. 
The technology transfer to be expected in future raises quite 
generally the question of whether a supplier state is fulfilling 
the complete extent of its political responsibility as a 
carrier and beneficiary of transfer if it exclusively limits 
cooperation with the recipient state to the initial delivery 
of plants and materials. The current international situation 
draws attention to the fact that the behaviour of the supplier 
countries will have to be reconsidered in future. This is 
particularly true if the specific interests of the recipient 
country are considered in more detail. From this point of 
view it is obvious that the recipient state in general rightly 
expects that the supplier state will include cooperation 
in the whole field of the fuel cycle. A recipient country 
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which admittedly obtains a plant, but which does not receive 
any guarantee of the effective utilization of the plant within 
the whole cycle can, in certain circumstances, end up in 
a precarious Situation. International nuclear transfer will 
thus have to pay increased attention in future to the idea 
of the necessity of comprehensive cooperation between the 
supplier and recipient state. 
Moreover, this point of view is not only valid from the per-
spective of the recipient state. In view of the international 
objectives involved of necessity in i~creased technology 
transfer, it is also obvious from the persp~ctive of the 
international community that the supplier country must assume 
specific responsibility for solving these new problems. This 
is equally true of the supply assurance sector, as well as 
of problems of averting dang~rs for the recipient state and 
of the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The question thus arises of whether an international causation 
principle cannot be defined here, which would impose obligations 
on the supplier state, especially in the back-end sector, 
of supporting the recipient country in solving these sensitive 
problems. Suggestions of how these cooperation obligations 
could be determined within such a causation principle could 
be compiled in a code of conduct (see supplementary volume). 
5.4 Regulation of the Management of Spent Fuel in the Atomic 
Energy Act 
Before discussing details of the phased plan, the legal boundary 
conditions of the national legislation should first be indicated 
which could be of significance for the indiviqual elements of 
the phased plan. 
Tagether with the passing of the German Atomic Energy Act in 1959, 
the Federal legislators were empowered pursuant to Art. 74 no. 11a 
· regulat;on for the disposal of radio-of the Basic Law, to ~ssue a • 
active waste. seventeen years passed before this regulationwas 
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enacted. The pertinent standard in § 9a of the Atomic Energy Act 
has envisaged since 1976: 
§ ga Utilization of Residual Radioactive Substances and Disposal 
of Radioactive Waste 
(1) Whoever constructs, operates, is oth~rwise in possession 
of, significantly modifies, shuts down er removes facilities 
handling nuclear fuels, handles radioactive substances 
outside of such facilities er operates facilities for 
the generation of ionizating radiation, must make due 
provision that residual radioactive substances arising 
as well as dismantled or dismounted radioactive facility 
components 
1. are utilized without darnage according to the purposes 
designated in § 1 nos. 2 to 4 er, 
2. if this is not possible according to the present 
state of science and technology, not economically 
viable er incompatible with the purposes designated 
in § 1 nos. 2 to 4, shall be disposed of in an orderly 
manner as radioactive waste. 
(2) Whoever is in possession of radioactive waste shall 
surrender this to a plant pursuant to Par. 3. This does 
not apply insofar as other provision is made on the 
basis of a legal regulation issued on the basis of this 
Act, or directed er approved on the basis of this Act 
er such a legal regulation. 
(3) The Laender are to establish collecting points for the 
interim storage of radioactive waste occurring in their 
territory, and the Federal Government is to establish 
facilities for safe management and final disposal of 
radioactive waste. They may make use of third parties 
to fulfill their obligations. 
The problems in interpreting this regulation which have resulted 
in the past few years come from viewing it ~ogether with 
the regulation determining the preconditions for licensing 
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plants. § 7 (2) Subpar. 3 determines that a licence can only 
be granted if "necessary precautions against darnage by the 
establishment and operation of the plant are made according 
to the current state of science and technology". 
After the enactment of § 9a, the legal position with respect 
to the management of spent fuel is clouded by a series of 
difficult interpretation problems which have not yet been 
unambiguously clarified by the courts. 
(a) The Federal Government's Obligations to Establish Plants 
for the safe management and final disposal of radioactive 
waste 
§ 9a Par. 3 is not constructed as a standard of competence 
but rather as a standard of obligation: "··· the Federal 
Government must establish plants". The Federal Government's 
Obligation to set up such facilities within a certain period 
cannot be taken from the wording of the regulation. Nevertheless, 
it still remains unclear whether the regulation should not 
be interpreted in a manner ensuring in effect that the Federal 
Government acts within a limited period of time. This period 
of time could possibly be fixed in such a way that the further 
utilization of nuclear energy, upon which the Atomic Energy 
Act is based, would not be jeopardized. The criteria according 
to which such a period of time should be determined in legal 
proceedings would require careful consideration. The priority 
issue, however, concerning the legal implementation of the 
Federal Government's fulfillment of its obligations, would 
in any case be the question of which persons would be entitled 
to initiate proceedings with such a goal. The catalogue of 
problems thus involved has not yet been conclusively established 
in any way. 
(b) Obligations of the Laender to establish facilities for 
interim storage of radioactive waste. 
Questions similar to those discussed immediately above also 
arise in interpreting § ga. 
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(c) The effect of § 9a on the licensing of nuclear plants. 
The significance of § 9a for the licensing procedure pursuant 
to § 7 of the Atomic Energy Act is the subject of a series 
of - not always unanimous - opinions in the literature and 
has also already led to different decisions in legal proceedings. 
The difficulty in discussions on this topic is mainly to 
be found in the fact that, on the one hand, the legislators 
have consciously avoided including the regulation for management 
of spent fuel prescribed in § 9a in substance in § 7 concerning 
regulations for the licensing of plants. This form of the 
regulation indicates that the legislators did not want to 
change the preconditions contained in § 7 by introducing 
§ 9a. On the other hand, it is quite unmistakable from the 
wording of § 9a that it is also to be understood as a con-
cretization of the protective goal of the Act contained in 
§ 1 Par. 2, i.e. "of protecting life, health and material 
goods from the dangers of nuclear energy and the damaging 
effect of ionizing radiation". This protective goal is also 
unquestionably to be regarded as the guiding principle in 
interpreting § 7. 
The question thus arises of whether § 9a is to be regarded as an 
independent standard only applicable with respect to specific 
back-end problems, or whether its effect also refers to the 
problern of licensing an individual plant in the sense emanating 
from § 1. In this respect, the first question arising from 
the wording of § 7 is whether the regulation of the management 
of spent fuel concerns the field of "establishing and operating" 
a plant discussed in § 7 at all. A form of argumentation 
would be conceivable according to which the question of the 
management of spent fuel is a general problern in the development 
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, not therefore concerning 
the ''establishment and operation" of a specific plant at 
all, and therefore cannot be considered within the licensing 
procedure pursuant to § 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. Although 
such a point of view has occasional proponents in the literature, 
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the majority of authors rightly do not espouse such an inter-
pretation. The replacement of spent fuel elements and the 
immediately associated measures for disposing of the radioactive 
substances are also part of "operating" a plant. Since according 
to the wording of § 7, management of spent fuel is thus included 
in the operations to be considered in the licensing procedure, 
the more general question of the effects of the revised regula-
tion in § 9a on the licensing procedure is raised. Three 
answers are in principle conceivable. On the one band, the 
opinion can be justified that according to the introduction 
of § ga, a licensing of new plants ("expansion") may no langer 
be granted as long as the plans for the management.of spent 
fuel required in § ga have not been bindingly presented. 
The opposite position to this would be to regard § 7 and 
§ 9a as strictly separated areas of regulation whose contents 
do not mutually affect each other. A conciliatory approach 
might take the form that the courts are not to ascribe any 
decisive importance to the problern of spent fuel management 
in licensing procedures, however they are obliged pursuant 
to the decision of the legislators concerning § 9a of the 
Atomic Energy Act to attribute more significance to management 
of spent fuel than in the earlier legal regulation. The latter 
interpretation would be conceivable since licensing of an 
atomic plant is anyway at the discretion of the licensing 
authority according to the formulation of § 7 Atomic Energy 
Act. 
The higher administrative court (OVG) at Lüneburg supported 
the first alternative mentioned above (plan for management 
of spent fuel as a precondition for expansion) /5.2/. The 
court argues that § 9a presumed a definite concept for spent 
fuel management arrd therefore an expansion of nuclear energy would 
only be permissible if no insurmountable legal obstacles were present 
to the realization of this concept in a preliminary general 
evaluation. "Compact storage" is not to be equated with the 
manner of spent fuel management stipulated in § 9a. For this 
reason the regulation of § 9a must already be observed in 
licensing. It can also be seen from the court's ruling that 
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in the view of the court higher demands are also to be made 
on the realization of the concept for spent fuel management 
standardized in § 9a with progress in establishing new plants. 
Whereas the higher administrative court (VGH) of Baden-Württem-
berg /5.3/ evaluated the significance of § 9a differently 
from the OVG at Lüneburg. This court viewed § 9a as an inde-
pendent duty to act which does not have any direct effect 
on the licensing procedure. The court takes the view that 
the question of the management of spent fuel does not come 
within the terms of "establishment and Operation" in the 
sense of § 1. The lack of a realization of the spent fuel 
management concept pursuant to § 9a does not necessarily 
result in an endangerment to third parties; interim storage 
would therefore also satisfy the legal demands. From these 
principles, the court concludes with respect to an appeal 
against a construction licence that there is currently no 
more closely defined group of persans who would have the 
right to lodge such an appeal. In the court's opinion this 
may well change when the spatial ~nd technical modalities 
of spent fuel management pursuant to § 9a are established. 
In effect the court therefore concludes that § 9a does indeed 
impose duties to act upon the Federal Government, the Laender 
and the operators, but that this does not have any effect 
on the licensing procedure. Admittedly, neither can it be 
seen fröm the ruling of the VGH at Mannheim that the problern 
of spent fuel management should be completely ignored in 
the granting of licences for constructing new plants. As 
part of its discretion, the licensing authority can include 
the question of spent fuel management in its considerations 
on granting a licence. However, this discretionary decision 
can only be examined by the courts to a limited extent; dis-
cretionary decisions are only examined by courts to discover 
whether they appear arbitrary. It can at present hardly be 
said whether and when it would be conceivable in future that 
courts would overrule the decision of licensing authority 
because lack of consideration for issues of spent fuel manage-
ment seemed arbitrary. 
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§ 9a (1) regulates the manner of spent fuel management. The 
wording of the regulation makes it clear that the legislators 
had not decided in favour of a certain form of spent fuel 
management to be mandatory under all circumstances. Sub-par. 
says that the residual materials must be "safely utilized". 
Howev_er, under certain c~rcumstances pursuant to Sub-par. 2 
"orderly disposal" is regarded as a legitimate form of spent 
fuel management. This is valid (a) if a utilization pursuant 
to Sub-par. 1 is not possible "according to the state of 
science and technology", (b) if utilization pursuant to Sub-par. 
is not economically viable, or (c) the purposes described 
in § 1 nos. 2 to 4 cannot be achieved. This structure of 
Art. 9a (1) therefore makes it clear that the law gives priority 
to "safe utilization" and intends "orderly disposal" to be 
a permissible form of spent fuel management of lower priority. 
As far as terminology is concerned it must be established 
that "safe utilization" at the present state of technology 
can only mean utilization by reprocessing in a reprocessing 
plant. It can therefore also be presumed that the legislators 
assumed a reprocessing plant on German soil; admittedly this 
assumption is not expressed in the text. 
If one then considers whether this legal position indicates 
that the establishment and operation of a reprocessing plant 
on German territory is mandatory then one comes up against 
difficulties because there is no explicit directive concerning 
the construction of a reprocessing plan~. The legislators 
apparently presumed that such a plant would be constructed 
even without a legal directive. If this assumption should 
not be valid then a series of reasons could be decisive. 
The question of finance will undoubtedly also play a role 
in the decision-making process. If the refusal were on the 
basis of economic efficiency then such a decision would un-
doubtedly be legally unobjectionable in view of the formulation 
of § 9a (1). The position could be different if reasons other 
than those listed in § ga (1) Sub-par. 2 were decisive. If 
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the manner of spent fuel management should in general develop 
differently from the overall concept envisaged in § 9a, then 
it could be argued with good reason that the legislative 
intent was no langer being observed. Different conclusions 
could once again be derived from this. On the one hand, the 
view could be put forward that non-observation of the legislative 
intent could make further operation of the existing plants 
unlawful and thus the executive would have to order closure 
of the plants; the other justifiable opinion would be that 
under these circumstances the legislator would be obliged 
to issue an amended regulation removing existing uncertainties. 
For some time legal developments have in a certain sense 
been approaching the situation described above, in that on 
the one hand it cannot be assumed that the reasons envisaged 
in§ 9a {1) Sub-par. 2 for the "disposal" solutionarenot 
present, but on the other hand there is no concrete sign 
of any realization of safe utilization envisaged as a priority 
in § 9a ( 1) Sub-par. 1. Whereas the spent fuel management 
principles of 6 May, 1977, still maintained establishment 
of a reprocessing plant as a priority, this principle is 
no langer clearly contained in the guidelines of 20 February, 
1980. It can no langer be seen from the "parallel approach" 
that the reprocessing decision should have priority. It could 
be conceivable to regard present principles for the management 
of spent fuel as part of a "phased concept of spent fuel 
management" and to consider construction of a reprocessing 
plant as a component of the overall concept to be carried 
out later. Admittedly, this perspective is in a certain cantrast 
to current principles of spent fuel management which do not 
display any plans whatsoever for the further medium-term 
implementation of the overall concept. 
In conclusion it must be seen that the present legal situation 
does not permit any clear statement of whether construction 
of a reprocessing plant is legally stipulated or not; the 
wording of § 9a of the AtG must therefore be described as 
inadequate from the present point of view. The reassessment 
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of the principles of spent fuel management in 1980 clouded 
the legal position even further by formulating this in a 
manner tqat was very difficult to reconcile with the legislative 
intention expressed in § 9a. 
With respect to the question of whether direct final disposal 
represents a form of spent fuel management which fulfills 
the demands of the Atomic Energy Act {AtG), then the legal 
position is quite clear. Namely, only in cases where utilization 
{a) is not possible according to the state of science and 
technology, {b) it is not economically viable, or {c) it 
does not permit the protection of life, health and material 
goods from the dangers of nuclear energy does the Atomic 
Energy Act permit final disposal. The issue currently unclear 
is the circumstances under which compact storage or interim 
storage is compatible with the Atomic Energy Act. Individual 
courts bave recently put forward the opinion that such forms 
of storage are permissible for a maximum duration of two 
years /5.4/. This is justified by regarding § 9a of the AtG 
as representing a conclusive regulation of all possible forms 
of spent fuel management. This is opposed from the other 
position by maintaining that the regulation for spent fuel 
management in § 9a is only valid for the future legal position, 
but not for the present situation /5.5/. 
Such an answer to this question does not seem possible at 
the moment. The wording of the Act does not provide any clear 
basis for an interpretation which would exclude the applicability 
of § 9a to the current situation. On the other band, it could 
however be argued that a corresponding legislative intent 
resulted from the materials as well as from the essence and 
purpose of the Act. In effect, under these circumstances 
one will have to speak of a legal uncertainty in this standards 
area before a decision is made by the supreme court. 
There is no indication in the Atomic Energy Act that the 
reprocessing of foreign material would be unlawful in a German 
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plant. This is also valid for the objectives of the Act in 
§ 1. The same regulations are thus applicable to the recycling 
of foreig~ material as to the corresponding treatment of 
material previously used in Germany. 
The question of whether spent fuel management pursuant to 
§ 9a of the AtG could also be carried out by the German operator 
being involved in a foreign reprocessing plant (e.g. Barnwell) 
and undertaking recycling there is not expressly regulated 
in the AtG. § 9a says that the operator "must make provision 
for" safe utilization. No basic prohibition of utilization 
abroad can be taken from this wording; nevertheless, special 
legal questions will undoubtedly arise. 
It would be natural to assume that utilization abroad would 
only then correspond to the demands of § 9a of the AtG if 
this were to take place within a framewerk which ensured 
the continuous fulfillment of the duty established in § 9a. 
In this sense, it would have to be required that cooperation 
wi~h the foreign partner could only be terminated at the 
end of a period which would be long enough to permit alternative 
solutions in the sense of § 9a of the AtG ("transitional 
period"). For example with respect to Barnwell, it can thus 
be established that a participation without simultaneaus 
efforts at domestic reprocessing would only fulfill the demands 
of § 9a of the AtG if the legal framewerk for cooperation 
were designed in such a way that termination would not have 
to be expected before expiry of the "transitional period" 
mentioned above. The duration of this period will in the 
last analysis probably depend an the time in which construction 
of a plant in Germany could be completed; the minimum would 
seem to be a decade. 
The question is therefore how cooperation would have to be 
designed in order to fulfill the requisite preconditions. 
A plant in Barnwell would be subject to American legislation. 
The NNPA does not conflict with the participation of a foreign 
cancern (cf. the study by Doub and Muntzing, see Chap. 5.6.2). 
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However, there would have to be reservations with respect 
to the aspect that the NNPA can be modified by the American 
legislation at any time; these circumstances would hardly 
permit one to speak of the assured expectation of continuous 
cooperation. A different answer could admittedly result if 
cooperation between the USA and Germany were to be agreed 
upon in a treaty under international law in such a way that 
termination of cooperation within the "transitional period" 
would be legally impossible on the part of the USA. Only 
cooperation on the basis of international law would make 
it possible for cooperation with Barnwell to be regarded 
as fulfilling the duty pursuant to § 9a of the AtG. 
5.5 Phased Plan for Institutional Aspects in Spent Fuel 
Management 
Before details of cooperation models are depicted by means of 
which the supplier countries can possibly support the recipient 
countries with nuclear plants and materials, an analysis is 
required of the paths of spent fuel management basically 
possible in the recipient country itself as well as the cor-
responding coupling to the supplier country. Fig. 5. 1 shows 
various possibilities of spent fuel management as an interaction 
between recipient country and supplier country. In considering 
spent fuel management, the reprocessing and reutilization 
of separated plutonium for MOX fabrication or for the fabrication 
of breeder fuel elements has also been included. Interim 
storage of spent fuel elements, their reprocessing, the possi-
bility of direct final disposal of spent fuel elements as 
well as the final disposal of radioactive waste are technical 
stages of relevance here for spent fuel management. IPS, 
MOX fabrication and fabrication of breeder fuel elements 
are technical stages which can be of importance in the further 
processing of the plutonium produced. 
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Instead of discussing in detail all conceivable ·possibilities 
of inte~actions in spent fuel mana'gement between the ~ecipient 
and expo~ting count~y we shall ~est~ict ou~selves to the 
analysis of the, in our opinion, most probable paths fo~ 
spent fuel management {b~oad ar~ows}. The spent fuel elements 
would accordingly first remain in the ~ecipient country itself 
for interim storage. Such inte~im sto~age could be maintained 
fo~ a ~elatively long pe~iod of time. If one assumes that 
afte~ interim sto~age in the recipient count~y of about 10 
years there we~e still no domestic ~eprocessing available, 
then t~ansfe~ of the spent fuel elements with inte~im storage 
and subsequent reprocessing in the supplie~ count~y could 
be offe~ed. The plutonium resulting f~om this reprocessing 
would first be stored in an IPS and subsequently converted 
into fuel elements by MOX fab~ication in the supplie~ country. 
These fuel elements could then be ~etu~ned for further util-
ization in the recipient country's reactor. In any case, 
the radioactive waste from reprocessing would have to be 
placed in a final repository in the recipient country at 
a later point in time. For reasons of acceptance, it seems 
impossible for the supplier country to take over radioactive 
waste. The plutonium obtained from reprocessing could also 
be used as MOX fuel in a reactor or as breede~ fuel in a 
breeder in the supplier country after an appropriate credit 
had been negotiated. 
A further possibility of supporting spent fuel management 
could be that fuel elements from the recipient country would 
be directly accepted for interim storage and further utilization 
in the supplie~ country (narrow arrows}. 
If the recipient country has its own reprocessing capacity 
available then the same spent fuel management and further 
utilization paths for plutonium as described above can be 
implemented {medium arrows). 
The realization of direct final disposal of fuel elements 
seems unlikely both in the recipient and supplier country 
as well for both economic and ecological reasons. 
Recipient Country 
Reactor 
I 
Interim Storage 
r~------~----~-
n: Reprocessing 
~,--------~.-------~ 
' 
m Dis 
FBR-FE MOX-FE 
Fabrication 
lll I 
FBR Reactor 
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Supplier Country 
Reactor Construction 
FE Fabrication 
Interim Storage 
Reprocessing 
MOX-FE FBR-FE 
Fabrication 'Fabrica tion 
Reactor FBR 
Fig. 5-1 Possibilities of Spent Fuel Management as Interaction 
between Recipient and Supplier Country 
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What technical and institutional possibilities are there 
then in order to implement support for the recipient countries 
from the supplier countries according to the models sketched 
above? In order to answer this question it is meaningful 
to first identify three technical steps: interim storage 
of fuel elements, fuel element reprocessing, and the treatment 
and final disposal of radioactive waste. The first and most 
important spent fuel priority in the country receiving reactors 
is to guarantee the safe interim storage of spent fuel elements. 
Si~ce such an interim storage of spent fuel elements has 
proved to be possible for 10 - 20 years, command of this 
step in spent fuel management means a medium-term solution 
to the whole problern of spent fuel management. If this medium-
term step in spent fuel management is selected in the recipient 
country then the supplier country should provide appropriate 
support in plant design and the construction of interim stores. 
In addition to supporting the design and management of such 
a store, storage canisters (e.g. CASTOR) could also be made 
available for longer-term storage. Storage of spent fuel 
elements themselves can be implemented in compact stores 
at the reactor or else in larger central interim stores. 
If there is sufficient storage capacity available for spent 
fuel elements in the supplier country itself, then spent 
fuel elements from the recipient country could also be accepted 
here. This could be of special significance if fairly small 
nuclear energy programmes are planned in the recipient countries. 
If one considers long-term seenarios for spent fuel management 
in countries receiving nuclear plants then the possibility 
of reprocessing spent fuel elements cannot be ruled out. 
Support for the recipient country from the supplier country 
thus suggests itself within the framewerk of appropriate 
cooperation; the growing programme size in the recipient 
country determining the rhythm of this cooperation. A phased 
plan is conceivable envisaging a growing intensification 
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in the economic, financial and technological sector with 
respect to the reprocessing of spent fuel elements. It begins · 
with the offer of reprocessing services by the supplier country 
and finishes with a domestic plant in the recipient country. 
The individual phases can be described as follows: 
reprocessing service by the supplier country 
financial participation in reprocessing by the recipient 
country in the supplier country itself 
management participation by the recipient country in 
reprocessing in the- supplier country 
oparational participation (operating personnel) by the 
recipient country in the reprocessing plant in the supplier 
country 
multinational plant as a branch operation in the recipient 
country. 
This phased rnodel can be basically regarded as a possible 
guideline in the field of international cooperation in repro-
cessing. The rhythm in which the individual phases are to 
be established can be adapted to the individual circumstances 
of the recipient and supplier country. For this reason no 
fixed size of installed nuclear power station capacity can 
be allocated to the individual phases either. The state of 
domestic technology, economic efficiency, and the desire 
for independence play an important role. If the technical, 
economic and also political boundary conditions are favourable 
in the country in question, then individual steps can be 
skipped or a domestic reprocessing plant can even be directly 
constructed in the recipient country. 
The third technical step in spent fuel management refers 
to the treatment and final disposal of radioactive waste. 
Support in planning and constructing facilities for treating 
and conditioning waste from nuclear plants can once again 
be offered by the supplier country. The problems of the final 
disposal of radioactive waste can, however, only be dealt 
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with if highly active waste f~om ~ep~ocessing plants is p~esent; 
that is t~ say they must be conside~ed on a long-te~m basis. 
In this connection, the supplie~ count~y should offe~ suppo~t 
in studying suitable geological fo~mations fo~ a final ~eposito~y 
and gua~antee suppo~t in the planning and const~uction of 
such final ~eposito~ies fo~ ~adioactive waste. In p~inciple, 
it must be assumed that ~adioactive waste f~om nuclea~ plants 
in the ~ecipient count~y will also be suitably conditioned 
and sto~ed the~e. Acceptance of such waste by the supplie~ 
count~y seems p~oblematic even in the long te~m. 
If one conside~s the time f~ame fo~ the necessity of int~oducing 
the individual technical steps in waste fuel management, 
then it appea~s that afte~ solving the inte~im sto~age of 
fuel elements (as well as t~eatment of ~adioactive waste) 
a medium-te~m solution to spent fuel management has al~eady 
been found. All fu~the~ steps can be app~oached on a long-te~m 
basis in suitable coope~ation phases with the supplie~ count~y. 
As al~eady mentioned above, tying p~og~amme sizes to the 
individual spent fuel management steps is difficult. Howeve~, 
if one assumes that, acco~ding to cu~~ent pe~spectives, ~ep~o­
cessing plants of the o~de~ of 700 t annual heavy metal th~ough-
-
put ~ep~esent an economic size then the establishment of 
such a plant in the ~ecipient count~y could indicate a ~ough 
fixing of the nuclea~ ene~gy p~og~ammes. A financial commitment 
of the ~ecipient count~y by pa~ticipation in a plant in the 
supplie~ count~y will only take place if this spent fuel 
management step is alsotobe ~ealized in.the lang te~m in 
its own te~~ito~y. A p~og~amme size of app~oximately 10 GW 
seems to be ~ealistic he~e. Howeve~, such figu~es can only 
be ~ough ~efe~ence values which can diffe~ depending on con-
ditions specific to the count~y. 
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Tab. 5-1 Phased Plan for Support from Supplier Countries 
for Recipient Countries in Spent Fuel Management 
Technical Steps in Spent Fuel 
Management 
Interim storage of FE 
FE reprocessing 
Treatment and final disposal of 
radioactive waste 
Institutional Steps in Spent Fuel 
Management 
. Storage in recipient country 
Support in plant design and 
construction, supply of 
equipment, e.g. CASTOR canisters 
• Storage in supplier country 
Acceptance of spent FE by 
supplier country 
. Reprocessing service by the 
supplier country 
. Financial participation in 
reprocessing plant by the 
recipient country in the 
supplier country 
. Management participation 
of the recipient country 
in reprocessing plant in 
the supplier country 
. Operating participation 
(operating personnel) by 
the recipient country in 
reprocessing plant in the 
supplier country 
. Multinational plant as a 
branch operation in the 
recipient country 
. Support in the plan~ing 
and construction of plants 
for treating and condit~oning 
waste 
. Support in the exploration 
of geological formations 
for final repositories 
. Support in the planning 
and construction of final 
repositories for radioactive 
waste 
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Tab. S-2 Applicability of the Phased Plan 
Spent Fuel Management Steps Pr~gramme Size Time Frame 
Interim storage of FE • unlimited at once - 20 years 
• smaller pro- 3-year interim 
FE reprocessing 
Treatment and final 
disposal of radioactiv~ 
waste 
grammes planned storage at the 
reactor 
• 
• 10 GW 
• 
• 
• 20 GW 
• 
• 10 GW 
• 20 GW 
long-term 
at once 
couplad to repro-
cessing plant in the 
long term 
II 
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5.6 The Reprocessing Plant 
5.6.1 Introduction 
Two essential reasons can be stated for the reprocessing 
of spent fuel elements from nuclear power stations: 
1. The recovery of non-consumed uranium as well as bred plutonium 
in order to conserve reserves of raw materials. 
2. The isolation and conditioning of radioactive fission 
products and actinides with the goal of final disposal 
and environmental protection. 
However, the relevance of reprocessing to proliferation is 
to be found in plutonium Separation. For this reason, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency is working intensively 
on control concepts with those states who are about to commer-
cialize reprocessing in the foreseeable future. Precisely 
the non-nuclear-weapons states Japan and Germany believe 
that they must carry out reprocessing of nuclear fuel due 
to their lack of domestic uranium reserves in order to guarantee 
their energy supply against external influences.in the long 
term. Furthermore, the Federal Republic also has a legal 
regulation requiring evidence of spent fuel management before 
nuclear power stations can be put into operation. In addition 
to the interim storage of spent fuel elements, reprocessing 
currently forms an accepted possibility for spent fuel manage-
ment. Furthermore, direct final disposal of spent fuel elements 
is also being studied, but this raises not inconsiderable 
problems of nuclear material safeguards. 
Further important aspects result for the Federal Republic 
since it is also among the countries exporting nuclear technology. 
Recipient countries with fairly small nuclear energy programmes 
could, for example, ensure their spent fuel management by 
returning spent fuel elements to a reliable supplier country 
such as the Federal Republic. This would at the same time 
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have the aavantage that such recipient countries would ~njoy 
higher credibility with respect to their own non-proliferation 
policy. Conversely, the Federal Republic undoubtedly also 
has a vital interest in continuing to be regarded as a non-nuclear-
weapons state in the eyes of the international public. 
The essential components of a reprocessing plant are mentioned 
in the supplementary volume. A discussion of safeguards for 
such plants is also included there. In the present Chapter, 
on the other band, a phased plan is presented and then evaluated 
as an innovation for international cooperation in reprocessing 
spent fuel elements from nuclear power stations. 
5.6.2 Institutional Models 
The discussion of international cooperation in connection 
with the operation of reprocessing plants should, apart from 
the problems in possible cooperation models'between the supplier 
and recipient state already mentioned, first consider the 
concrete situation in Germany, making two different assumptions: 
1. the plant is sited in Germany, 
2. the plant is sited abroad. 
Once again, several approaches are possible with respect 
to the legal structure and ·international composition of the 
operator in question. Before special assumptions are made 
in this connection, the consequences resulting from the two 
preconditions mentioned above should be discussed in detail. 
It should merely be assumed that the plant is subject to 
a national legal system. 
As far as a possible danger of proliferation emanating from 
the Federal Republic is concerned, a commercial plant abroad 
would offer greater advantages from the perspective of the 
international community since the Federal Government would 
not have any direct influence on the plant. Great political 
dependence would result from the fact that the rederal Republic 
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would always have to display good political conduct towards 
the host state in order to obtain uninterrupted a$surance 
of the necessary services and materials. Supply of services 
and materials, as well as the associated planning in the 
energy sector, would not be ensured under all circumstances. 
Moreover, in such a case the Federal Republic would have 
to refrain from its own development and utilization of modern 
technology, so that at least in ·some sectors it would fall 
behind the modern industrialized states. 
If one assumes that an operator also offers reprocessing 
services to other states, then this would favour an economic 
plant size and a lower price w~uld be possible. The technological 
know-how remains in the state constructing and operating 
the plant. Technology transfer could thus be ruled out. A 
further important aspect is environmental protection. As 
far as the Federal Republic is concerned, a plant abroad 
would have advantages. Finally"an aspect must be mentioned 
closely connected with supply assurance. The Federal Republic 
would be exposed to the possibility of sanctions with respect 
to reprocessing services if there were a reason to assume 
proliferation activity in the Federal Republic on the part 
of the host state. 
Under the special assumption that the Federal Republic could 
participate, in some form, in a foreign plant then this could 
result in the first place in certain improvements in the 
sector of economic efficiency, since the operator could no 
longer demand arbitrary prices for his services. Furthermore, 
limited possibilities in the technology transfer sector as 
well as supply and planning assurance would be conceivable. 
Operation of a reprocessing plant in Germany, in which material 
used abroad would also be recycled, would at the current 
state of development also have to consider the existence 
of prior consent regulations. States supplying Germany's 
cooperation partner could obstruct cooperation of the type 
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envisaged here by prohibiting the transfer of material coming 
from their country to Germany by means of the prior consent 
agreement. In order to prevent such a disturbance of cooperation 
it would be expedient to receive a contractual assurance 
from the supplier state to the effect that the latter would 
not obstract cooperation between the recipient state and 
Germany. In this respect, the contractual partners of the 
supplier state could be either the recipient state, the Federal 
Republic or both states. 
The contract would have to determine in detail the conditions 
under which the supplier state would approve cooperation 
between Germany and recipient state. 
From another point of view the question would thus arise 
of the extent to which a cooperation model .of the type mentioned 
could give .the supplier state grounds to generally dispense 
with prior consent demands on the recipient state. If one 
considers the content of previous prior consent agreements 
(cf. Chap. 3.4) then it appears that problems of transferring 
supplied material to third countries on the one hand, as 
well as enrichment on the other hand, would still be relevant 
from the perspective of the supplier state by cooperation 
in the reprocessing sector. It could thus at most be assumed 
that prior consent regulations could be simplified for the 
reprocessing sector by the forms of cooperation discussed here. 
The analysis of German participation in an American reprocessing 
plant is of interest. The US position with respect to inter-
national cooperation in the reprocessing sector can be summarized 
as follows 15.61, /5.7/. 
1. General 
In mid-1982 the US Government envisaged two basic changes 
to their expert policy in the nuclear energy sector. 
Foreseeable, p~ogrammatic arrangements for reprocessing 
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and the use of plutonium from American source material 
will be affered to the EEC countries and Japan. 
The USA will consider the expert of sensitive reprocessing 
technology and items of equipment to Japan and the EEC 
states, insofar as the overall NP interests of the USA 
are not infringed by this. This is to be reexamined from 
case to case. 
This new policy will not automatically take effect. It is 
rather a negotiating position. The US Government wants to 
attempt to persua~e Japan and EURATOM to renegotiate their 
cooperation agreements with the USA with.the aim of a revised 
version or modified agreement on cooperation. The US Government 
must be prepared to find that not all elements of their policy 
can be implemented and thus only a less comprehensive agreement 
with respect to international NP measures can be achieved. 
Finally, this new policy is to serve the· goal of reestablishing 
the leading international role of the USA in the nuclear 
energy sector. 
2. Possible DWK* Participation in Barnwell 
The US Government desire that in principle responsibility 
for commercial reprocessing in the USA is in the hands of 
private industry. 
The possibility of foreign participation, especially by the 
DWK, in Barnwell is not ruled out on the part of the Department 
of Energy (DOE). However, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (amended) 
prohibits foreign ownership, control or domination of plants 
on American territory. Foreign participation may not exceed 
50 %. Foreign participation in the Barnwell plant could essen-
tially take on three versions: 
* Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrenn-
stoffen mbH (German Company for Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel) 
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(1) The DWK enters into a partnership or limited partnership 
with American corporations for the sole purpose of Operating 
a plant. 
(2) The DWK forms a corporation w~th American concerns so 
that the liability from reprocessing activities remains 
limited to investment in the plant. 
(3) The status of ownership in Barnwell could be a mixture 
of public and private agencies. 
A corporation would be required for this which would 
be the property of the US Government and private contracting 
partners. The latter would also be the operator. 
Finally, there would also be the possibility of the US Government 
owning the plant, which would exclude financial participation 
from the private sector. 
3. Reutilization of Separated Plutonium 
German participation in Barnwell would have two essential 
motives; furnishing proof of spent fuel management and energy 
assurance by returning separated plutonium to the Federal 
Republic. The conditions must therefore be established under 
which plutonium recovered from American source material could 
be returned from the USA. First of all, it is clear that 
in principle there already is a licence for exporting fissionable 
material to the EEC. The export volume for plutonium is limited 
to 1500 kg within cooperation between the USA and EEC. However, 
this limitation exclusively refers to Pu transfer on the 
part of the US Government and not for Pu transfer carried 
out on a private basis. 
In conclusion it must be established that if a foreign concern 
is involved in Barnwell and the US Government participates 
even to a very slight extent, then the essential question 
could arise of whether Pu transfer would ~ctually be on the 
basis of private law. Even if this Pu transfer could be organized 
and implemented on a formally private basis, the question 
would nevertheless arise in law of whether the Pu transfer were 
not implemented in substance by the US Government after all. 
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This question has not yet been answered. 
It can thus be said by way of conclusion that for German 
conditions participation in a foreign plant cannot be desirable 
as the exclusive solution to spent fuel management. National 
solutions, offering the highest supply assurance, have absolute 
priority for the German Situation with a large nuclear programme 
and scarcity of resources. 
These remarks indicate tge essential basic problems of inter-
national cooperation. However, cooperation models in the 
field of nuclear energy should be oriented towards the principles 
of the IAEA Statute whose major g~al it is "to accelerate 
and increase the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, 
health and prosperity in the whole world". This goal involves 
corresponding objectives on the part of the IAEA and especially 
on the part of those member states who already have nuclear 
know-how available. These states ·consequently bear the moral 
responsibility for cooperating with and supporting those 
countries who also wish to utilize nuclear energy. 
Finally, this process leads to assuring coverage of energy 
requirements and to establishing mutual confidence between 
the nations and thus to stabilizing world peace. There is 
also the concomitant obligation to the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
In order to do justice to these principies the following 
phased model for international cooperation in the reprocessing 
sector would be conceivable; 
national plant with front- and back-end service, 
national plant with financial participation, 
national plant with multinational management, 
national plant with multinational operating personnel, 
branch operation as a multinational plant. 
In the stages ''financial particip~tion", "multinational manage-
ment" and "multinational operating personnel" this phased plan 
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also does justice to the growing technological needs of the 
developing countries and culminates in a domestic plant as 
a branch. operation when the nuclear programme has achieved 
a corresponding size. 
5.6.3 Evaluation 
Evaluation is carried out according to criteria already familiar. 
It is assumed that there is no danger of proliferation from 
the Federal Republic itself. The Federal Republic is rather 
very much aware of the responsibility which it accepts with 
respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by cooper-
ating in the nuclear energy sector. 
5.6.3.1 Rindering Proliferation 
The development of a phased plan for international cooperation 
in the field of reprocessing especially serves to support 
countries with fairly small nuclear energy programmes. The 
possible consequences arising for international safeguards 
will now be examined in more detail. The central problern 
is whether Art. 81d of INFCIRC/153 can be fulfilled in a 
more qualified manner by applying such models and whether 
a safeguards credit can even result with respect to a reduction 
of inspection effort in such multinational plants. 
Multinational models can in principle involve three advantages 
for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: 
reduction in the number of sensitive plants, 
contractual barriers against abuse, 
internal safeguards by multinational cooperation. 
The last area is certainly of special significance for the 
possible implications of safeguards. This is to be more closely 
examined on the basis of the following considerations of 
diversion problems. 
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A diversion of fissionable material refers to nuclear plants 
in which the nuclear material is subject to interna~ional 
safeguards. Diversion, just as the measures for its detection 
as well, presumes that all nec~ssary information about the 
nuclear material present is available. 
Among this is 
description of the material according to quantity, physical 
type and chemical composition, 
description of the paths taken by the material through 
the plant, 
description of the measuring methods used by the operator 
to trace and document the material in his plant, as well 
as 
description of the process steps to which the material 
is subject. 
In the final analysis, diversion attempts involve information 
to which the safeguards authority is contractually entitled 
being withheld from it. Some examples of possibilities for 
falsification can be mentioned: 
data are not made available, 
~ interference with IAEA measurements, 
falsification of the shipper/receiver inventory change 
reports for the same transaction, 
falsification of reports and records, 
drawing up incomplete, inprecise and inconsistent records, 
subsequent falsification of the accounts, 
use of dummy fuel elements, 
falsification of identification features. 
In Table 5-3 the forrns of cooperation listed in the phased 
plan are examined with respect to the opportunities they 
present for detecting diversion: 
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Tab. S-3: Possibilities of Detecting an Anomaly in Different 
Cooperation Models 
Plant 
only for internal requirements 
with front- and back-end 
service 
with financtal participation 
with multinational management 
with multinational operating 
personnel 
branch operation 
Possibilities of detecting 
an anomaly 
- IAEA safeguards 
- IAEA safeguards 
- IAEA safeguards 
- further information on 
plant operation 
- IAEA safeguards 
- the objective of tbe plant 
can only be modified by 
the whole management 
- IAEA safeguards 
- the actual operation 
of the plant is conducted 
and safeguarded by multi-
national personnel down 
to the last detail 
- IAEA safeguards 
- further possibilities 
of detection depending 
on the employment of 
multinational management 
or Operating personnel 
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If one considers the Table then in genera+ intensified possibil-
ities of detecting anomalies can be seen with increasing graduation 
of the models. This results from detailed knowledge and infor-
mation associated with cooperation concerning 
- plant operation and planning, 
- nuclear material management, 
- financing and budgeting, as well as 
- possible anomalies in the plant. 
More detailed, quantifiable statements can only be obtained here 
after the contractual elements of the various multinational 
models have been determined. The type and number of states 
involved would also have to be considered as further criteria. 
The model with multinational operating personnel as we~l as 
the branch operation model could offer the greatest possibility 
for detecting anomalies /5.8/. 
5.6.3.2 Poiitical Independence 
Political independence depends on the extent to which supply. 
of the necessary services and materials is guaranteed. This 
is undoubtedly guaranteed for the Operator or host state 
of a reprocessing plant. The following picture emerges for 
a recipient country: there is basically great political depen-
dence since the plant is subject to national law. This situation 
only changes in the last stage of cooperation if a branch 
operation is to be constructed and operated in the recipient 
country. This dependence is continually alleviated throughout 
the phases with financial participation, management participation 
and employment of multinational operating personnel, but 
the existing legal situation is not changed by this. 
5.6.3.3 Supply and Planning Assurance 
On the basis of current social conditions, recipient countries 
could presume the strict fulfillment of contractual obligations 
for the case of the Federal Republic. Supply and planning 
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assurance in these countries would thus not be a question 
of imponderabilities in the Federal Republic, but would depend 
on their own internal conditions. 
5.6.3.4 Profitability 
It is to be assumed that economic plant sizes will be implemented 
in the envisaged cooperation. The problern of multinational 
management and operating personnel and their influence on 
economic operation is to be regarded on a long-term basis. 
In the case of cooperation developing slowly and continuously, 
the negative influence of different nationalities and social 
origins should be small. 
5.6.3.5 Technology Transfer 
The transfer of sensitive and commercial know-how can be 
controlled in the envisaged cooperation. Only in later stages 
of cooperation, especially where multinational management 
or operating personnel are envisaged, does the question of 
technology transfer arise and will then have to be settled 
contractually. The construction of a branch operation in 
a recipient country presumes technology transfer. 
5.6.3.6 Environmental Protection 
The reprocessing plant makes the highest demands as far as 
environmental protection is concerned since the radioactive 
inventory of spent fuel elements from several nuclear reactors 
has to be chemically and physically controlled here. The 
problern of plant size therefore plays an especially important 
role in public discussion. Associated with this is the question 
of the quantity of spent fuel elements from foreign nuclear 
reactors to be reprocessed. 
5.6.3.7 Acceptance 
Acceptance by the national public depends in the first place 
on solution of environmental protection and in the secend place 
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on assurance of the energy supply. To this extent problems 
could arise in realizing the ph~sed pl~n if it cannot be 
clearly proven that environmental prot~ction is guaranteed 
in all phases. Difficulties could part~cularly arise by taking 
in foreign fuel elements since the radioactive inventory 
in the Federal Republic would thus be considerably increased. 
The problem of disposing both of domestic and also foreign 
waste would undoubtedly have to be solved in this connection. 
In later phases there would also be the problem of operating 
safety with the employment of foreign operating personnel. 
In contrast, a branch operation abroad would probably not 
raise acceptance problems of this type. In this case, the 
problern of proliferation would be of significance for inter-
national acceptance. 
5.6.3.8 Vulnerability to Sanctions 
Vulnerability to sanctions refers to the foreign partners 
without their own plant who could be hit by the non-performance 
of reprocessing services in the case of demonstrable prolif-
eration. However, the precondition is that the state aiming 
at obtaining nuclear weapons does not obtain reprocessing 
services elsewhere. 
5.6.4 Summary 
With respect to nuclear material safeguards, commercial re-
processing technology still requires some development work 
in the field of computer-assisted real time accountancy in 
order to comply with the IAEA's demands. A phased plan for 
international cooperation, particularly with threshold countries, 
is suggested which, on the one hand, is oriented to the goals 
of the IAEA in furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
·but which on the other hand also contains decisive factors 
for hindering proliferation. The phased plan envisages cooper-
ation between countriss supplying and receiving reactors, 
where in the first phase the countriss importing nuclear 
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technology are cffered services for reprocessing spent fuel 
elements. In the secend phase recipient countries can participate 
financially in reprocessing in order to thus consolidate 
their legal claims to services. The next cooperation stages 
envisage foreign participation in management and then assignment 
of foreign operating personnel. In the final phase, branch 
operations subject to national law in the recipient country 
are constructed and operated there. In this way the development 
and implementation of sensitive technologies in threshold 
countries could be delayed until such a time as greater social 
stability bad been established there which could possibly 
be promoted by serious cooperation with industrialized countries 
to encourage confidence. In the lang term, proliferation 
cannot be preven ted by sim_ply a t tempting to wi thhold technology 
from a country. Proliferation can only be bindered in the 
lang term by reliable cooperation and supply guarantees. 
5.7 Fuel Element Refabrication. Plant 
5. 7. 1 Introduction 
Countries with fairly large nuclear energy programmes deciding 
to introduce the reprocessing of spent fuel elements from 
nuclear reactors cannot dispense with fuel element refabrication. 
Obtaining fis~ionable material from spent fuel elements for 
the purpese of conserving raw materials (on the one hand 
and environmental protection by waste conditioning on the 
other hand) requires at the same time the re-employment and 
thus the fabrication of fuel elements containing plutonium. 
A situation comparable to the problems of reprocessing can 
thus be seen in fuel element refabrication. Handling separated 
plutonium makes the ownership and operation of a refabrication 
plant more proliferation-relevant than that of a facility 
in which exclusively low enriched uranium is processed into 
fuel elements /5.9/. However, in comparison with a reprocessing 
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facility there is an advantage from the point of view of 
international nuclear material safeguards in that the nuclear 
material (plutonium and uranium) can be much better verified 
from the outset in a refabrication plant. The incoming material 
comes from a reprocessing plant and/or from a uranium enrichment 
plant and has already been accounted for and verified. At 
the head end of the reprocessing plant, in contrast, only 
computational information is available about the nuclear 
material content in the spent fuel elements. Verification 
of the head end accountancy, especially in the fuel element 
dissolver of the reprocessing plant, therefore assumes very 
much more significance. 
5.7.2 Institutional Models 
However, in dealing with fuel element refabrication emphasis 
should be solely placed on the fact of processing separated 
plutonium. For this reason, it is suggested that the same 
forms of cooperation should be considered for refabrication 
plants as were previously discussed in dealing with reprocessing. 
A separate discussion therefore becomes superfluous. 
5.8 Repository for Spent Fuel Elements from Nuclear Power Stations 
5.8.1 Boundary Conditions 
It is to be presumed that a state has decided in favour of 
utilizing nuclear energy. Accordingly, after some time, a 
considerable fraction of its energy supply would be based 
on utilizing nuclear energy. The state under consideration 
has made the operation of nuclear power stations conditional 
upon providing proof of spent fuel management. There is no 
reprocessing of spent fuel elements or recycling of the fission-
able material. Waste management is to consist of direct final 
disposal of the spent fuel elements from nuclear power stations. 
Operation of a direct repository (D.R.) would thus be indis-
pensable for ensuring the energy supply. 
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Spent fuel elements are accordingly regarded as waste to 
be removed from the biosphere. The primary purpese of a D.R. 
consists of isolating the spent fuel elements from the human 
habitat in such a way that neither the fuel elements nor 
parts of them·can be brought back either by natural processes 
or human activities. 
A D.R. is to be designed, planned, constructed and operated 
in accordance with this condition. The licence for constructing 
and operating a D.R. will, however, not only have to consider 
the phase of storing spent fuel elements but also the post-apera-
tional phase. The latter basically comprises a period of 
time resulting from the radiotoxicity and going .far beyend 
the state of human experience for historical periods of time. 
In other words, licensing a D.R. also has to assume a post-apera-
tional phase in which the nuclear waste must be isolated 
from the biosphere. for many thousands of years. In addition 
to assuring the energy supply, environmental prötection is 
thus the secend cornerstone supporting the D.R .. 
With respect to long-term safeguards, there is a parallel 
between the conditions resulting from environmental protection, 
physical protection and nuclear material safeguards. Whereas 
it is conceivable that a D.R. could be equipped with inherent 
safety as far as environmental protection is concerned so 
that it could be left to its own devices, it must be presumed 
for reasons of safeguards that a government intends to recover 
the nuclear material for military purposes. It is certainly 
safe to assume that in future it will be tecbnologically 
easier to recover nuclear material from a D.R .. On tbe otber 
band, even tbe oparational pbase of a D.R. would seem to 
be problematical from tbe safeguards aspect. 
Tbe safeguards autbority must assume tbat a diversich could 
already be undertaken during tbe oparational pbase. On the 
one band, tbe problern of reverifying inventories would arise 
if anomaliss indicating a diversion were detected. On tbe 
otber hand, bindering a diversion would be a desirable goal 
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but not envisaged in NPT safeguards. The safeguards system 
would therefore have to raise an immediate alarm in order 
to ensure timely detection. A further basic problern is the 
question of terminating safeguards. In other words: under 
what circumstances would the safeguards authority be prepared 
to release fissionable material from spent fuel elements 
in a repository from nuclear material safeguards? This final 
aspect assumes a special role with respect to the passive 
phase of the repository, that is to say for the period beginning 
when after 50 years' operation the pit is shut down, filled 
in and sealed. 
5.8.2 Which Institutional Models can be Considered? 
From the point of view of a state wishing to assure its energy 
supply by operating a D.R., a purely national solution seems 
desirable. However, from the aspect of proliferation the 
problems of safeguardability are highlighted in the first 
instance. Diversion of nuclear material can certainly be 
carried out most easily during the active phase of the D.R .. 
Since a reverification of the nuclear material inventory would 
raise great problems, the D.R. must be operated in such a 
way that either a diversion is prevented from the very beginning 
or else at least clearly detectable without a renewed inventory. 
This requirement makes the highest possible d~gree of inter-
nationalization in plant management seem desirable, which 
is associated with an unavoidable loss of Sovereign rights. 
On the other hand institutional models under international 
law would be very difficult to realize for reasons of acceptance. 
It therefore seems more realistic to consider institutional 
models under national legal systems. Nevertheless, the possi-
bility must also be considered for the European region of 
the Commission of the European Communities being involved 
in a suitable manner in the operation of a D.R .. It is of 
significance in this connection that the EURATOM member states 
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only have an (unlimited) utilization right to nuclear m~terial 
anyway, but no proprietary rights. It would therefore be 
appropriate for EURATOM, as the owner of the nuclear material, 
to receive spent fuel elements from the member states for 
reasons of nuclear material safeguards. In this way the credi-
bility of the individual EURATOM member states would also 
be increased from an international perspective. 
In order to evaluate applicable institutional models, a D.R. 
should be considered on the one pand which is also the property 
of the state independently operating it. On the other hand, 
there is a D.R. at least operated by a multinational enter-
prise. 
The reader is referred in particular to Chapter 7, JUl-Spez-69 
for legal details. 
5.8.3 Evaluation 
Evaluation of the possibilities of an institutional solution 
is carried out on the basis of a series of criteria already 
presented in Chapter 5.2. 
5.8.3.1 Safeguardability 
Assuming that a reverification of fuel elements in a repository 
would raise very great problems, airtight safeguarding o.! 
the D.R. must be ensured. Each CIS alarm must involve a direct 
action by the inspector. Only by basically safeguarding all 
movements in the D.R. at all times can it be verified whether 
diversion has taken place or not. A diversion could thus 
also be detected without a renewed inventory of fuel elements 
already in the repository. 
In the passive phase of the D.R. when the pit had also been 
filled in and above ground plants shut down, no permanent 
inspector presence is expect~d to be necessary. It should 
be sufficient to safeguard the site with instruments together 
with regular inspections. 
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In these considerations· it is assumed that the D.R. is national 
. 
property under purely national operational management. Every 
diversion will therefore be detected immediately in good 
time by the uninterrupted inspector presence. A diversion 
can admittedly be detected in good time in this institutional 
model, but it cannot be prevented. 
Conditions would b~ quite different ~f the D.R. were operated 
multinationally, if for example EURATOM were to operate such 
a D.R .. In this connection it is tobe assumed that the host 
state of a multinational enterprise would renounce the exercise 
of certain sovereign rights in the locality of the D.R. in 
accordance with an international agreement through the national 
legislation and would at the same time undertake only to 
amend the relevant laws with the consent of the contractual 
partners. In the case of EURATOM it would only be legally 
possible to withdraw material from the repository with the 
consent of the remaining member states. In this case, d~version 
in the active phase of the D.R. could only be forced after 
launehing a massive action by the host state. Under these 
circumstances, diversion would be preceded by a violent conflict. 
These problems would only be defused if the fissionable material 
contained in the spent fuel elements were conditioned and 
placed in the repository in such a way that the safeguards 
authorities would accept this as proof of non-recoverability 
and could agree to a termination of safeguards. 
5.8.3.2 Hindering Proliferation 
Hindering proliferation should be understood here in the 
sense that proliferation is to be prevented as far as possible. 
Of the models under consideration here, this is only possible 
in the variant "multinational enterprise renouncing certain 
sovereign rights under international law". In the case of 
purely national operation of a D.R. with a permanent inspector 
presence without any renunciation of sovereignty, the major 
factor of prevention is to be found exclusively in deterring 
diversion by immediate detection. National enterprises with· 
the financial participation and service rights of third-party 
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states do not bave any additional relevance for increased 
hindrance of proliferation. Models with international operating 
personnel or management are also of significance in the first 
instance for detecting but not for preyenting diversion, 
since the host state could expel the foreign employees from 
its territory. 
5.8.3.3 Political Independence 
Political independence would only be completely ensured in 
a purely national model (ownership, operation), since only 
in this case would there be sufficient supply and planning 
assurance with respect to the management of spent fuel from 
nuclear power stations. On the other band, the EURATOM states 
have already waived their proprietary rights to nuclear material. 
It would therefore be conceivable for EURATOM to operate 
a D.R. on a multinational basis. 
5.8.3.4 Supply and Planning Assurance 
As an extention of the comments on political independence, 
it should also be considered that in multinational enterprises 
a ratiohing of the storage capacities would possibly be necessary 
insofar as the partner states were to insist on a contractually 
regulated reservation of repository capacity for their spent 
fuel elements. The flexibility of the host state in expanding 
it~ nuGlear energy programme could be limited by this. 
5.8.3.5 Profitability 
The question of profitability undoubtedly only plays a minor 
role. However, if profitability increases with the capacity 
of the D.R. then the following two aspects could be of signif-
icance: 
1. The D.R. could be designed for spent fuel elements from 
several countries. 
2. Apart from spent fuel elements, the D.R. could also 
receive other dangerous waste, e.g. heavy metal residues, 
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the disposal of which has not yet been considered in 
any thing like as much detail as that of nuclear waste. 
5.8.3.6 Technology Transfer 
A certain technological know-how must admittedly be available 
in the final disposal of spent fuel elements from nuclear 
power stations. However, this cannot be regarded as sensitive 
from the point of view of proliferation. Therefore no particular 
significance is ascribed to technology transfer. 
5.8.3.7 Environmental Protection 
This criterion is of paramount importance since the real 
goal of a D.R. is to reliably isolate radioactivity from 
the biosphere. For reasons of social acceptance, the question 
of the extent to which spent fuel elements from other countries 
should also be received is of significance here. The endangerment 
potential of the D.R. increases in principle by expanding 
capacity. It is decisive for political and social acceptance 
that the valid environmental protection laws of the host 
state are complied with. A host state will not be able to 
dispense with this. In this respect, the question of the 
organizational form is irrelevant for a D.R. operator. 
5.8.3.8 Acceptance and Vulnerability to Sauetions 
Political and social acceptance are orientated to assuring 
the supply of nuclear energy by waste management as well 
as guaranteeing functional environmental protection. The 
first criterion in particular is promoted by institutional 
models in which the host state is both owner and operator 
of the D.R .. At the sametime such models have an especially 
low degree of vulnerability to sanctions. This latter is 
highest for the model of a multinational D.R. wher~ certain 
sovereign rights have been renounced. Vulnerability to sanctions 
means bindering proliferation. 
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5.8.4 Summary 
With respect to environmental protection, it is irrelevant 
whether a D.R. is operated by a national or multinational 
enterprise since the host state has the possibility of insisting 
on observation of its valid environmental protection law. 
As far as proliferation hindrance is concerned, the difference 
is tc be found in that in a multinationally operated D.R. 
an essentially larger degree of prevention can be realized 
whereas in a purely national repository solely immediate 
detection can be guaranteed. Prevention is conditioned by 
the multinational personnel as well as the relinquishment 
of certain sovereign rights in the locality of the D.R .. 
Political independence by assuring waste management is promoted 
by national enterprises in which no international personnel 
is involved. 
However, participation by EURATOM in the operation of a D.R. 
would mean the consistent continuation of the propriet~ry 
right to nuclear material for the scope of the European Community. 
By renouncing their right to own nuclear material, the member 
states have already emphasized their confidence in the multi-
national organization. In this respect there does not seem 
to be any objection to a waste management concept with con-
siderable EURATOM participation. 
5.8.5 Other Countries' Possibilities 
In the following the technological possibilities and geological 
preconditions are described for the construction and operation 
of repositories (for spent FE/highly active waste) in other 
countries. 
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5.8.5.1 Introduction 
The application of institutional models in the field of final 
disposal, particularly the direct final dispos~l of spent 
fuel elements from LWR nuclear power stations, must on the 
one hand be oriented towards the actually existing worldwide 
nuclear energy programmes and on the other hand towards geo-
logical conditions. With respect to the nuclear energy programmes 
the references /5.10/, /5.11/ and /5.15/ were evaluated, 
with respect to purely geological aspects references /5.12/, 
/5.13/ and /5.14/ as well as several geological maps of various 
European regions. For reasons of time, the evaluation of 
the literature had to be restricted to salt formations. In 
the following the countries already operating nuclear energy 
programmes are listed. After that states are discussed who 
have already made known their plans concerning the utilization 
of nuclear energy. 
In evaluating geological conditions for the final disposal 
of highly active waste, it must however be considered that 
no statements can be made about the suitability of geological 
formations for the purpese in hand solely on the basis of 
data from the literature insofar as no corresponding programme 
of geological investigations has already been carried out 
in the country in question and the results published. The 
suitability of a geological formation depends inter alia 
essentially on its size and geometry as well as on the rate 
of run-off, fissuring, interstratifications and geological 
mobility. 
5.8.5.2 Countries with Nuclear Energy Programmes 
The following Table provides a summary of information on 
the geology and nuclear energy programmes of the individual 
countries already utilizing nuclear energy /5.16/. 
Tab. 5-4 
Region/Country 
EEC 
-
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Federal 
Republic of 
Germany 
France 
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Geology 
- clay (L'Argile de Boom 
a Mol) 
- slate (Ardennes) 
- dissected salt beds 
(pillow structure) in 
the Almelo/Hengelo 
district, 
thickness 30-100 m 
depth 300-400 m 
.- rock salt (pillow struc-
ture) in the Central 
Netherlands, thickhess 
up to 200 m 
- rock salt 
- iron ore 
- saline rock (pillow 
structure) in the 
Paris basin 
- salt pillows and domes 
in the Pyrenean foot 
hills 
- potash deposits in 
Alsace 
- granite* in the Massif 
Central and at La Hague 
Nuclear Energy Programme 
The possibilities are being 
investigated of final disposal 
in clay under the Mol research 
centre. 
The possibilities are being 
studied of final disposal 
in salt. 
The possibilities are being 
studied of final disposal in 
rocksalt (Asse) and iron 
ore (Konradl; drilling pro-
gramme in the Gorleben salt 
dome with respect to a first, 
commercial repository for 
radioactive waste, including 
suitability for highly active 
waste. 
The possibilities are being 
investigated of final dis-
posal in crystalline forma-
tions, especially in salt. 
Drillings have been under-
taken in granite at La Hague. 
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Tab. 5-4 Ccont.) 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
of Great 
Britain and 
Northern 
Ireland 
(GB) 
Western Europe 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
-loam/clay (South Italy) 
-granite* CSardinia) 
geologically very 
mobile** r-egion 
-rock salt, potash salts 
(Yorkshire, Durham), 
slight thickness 
limited formation 
-rock salt, gypsum 
(Isle of Man) 
-granite* (Scotland, 
North~rn Ireland) 
stable platform areas 
-loam, clay 
-anhydrite 
-granite* (in the heart 
of the Alps, e.g. 
Gotthard) geologically 
mobile** r-egion 
-granite* 
stable platform r-egion 
as par-t of the Baltic 
Shield 
Possibilities are being 
studied of final disposal 
in loam/clay beneath the 
Trisaia Center in South Italy 
Possibilities are being studied 
of final disposal in cr-ystal-
line formations (granite). 
The first repository should _ 
be operational in about the 
year 2000. 
Anhydr-ite for-mations are 
being studied for- the pur-
pese of final disposal in 
the Jura and in the Alps. 
See Ref. /5.11/: Site studies 
r-esulted in suitable granite 
for-mations for r-epositories 
in the or-der Karlshamm, Finnsjö 
and Kr-!kem!la. It is envis-
aged that galleries with 
vertical bore holes will 
be constructed at gr-eat depth. 
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Tab. 5-4 (cont.) 
Finland 
Spain 
Eastern Europe 
USSR 
-granite* 
stable platform region 
as part of the Baltic 
Shield 
-salt 
-loam/clay 
-anhydrite 
-crystalline formations 
(granite) 
-all formations 
available 
German Demo- -rock salt 
cratic Republfc 
Czecho-
slovakia 
Bulgaria 
-granite (no reliable 
information) 
-mobile regions 
Possibilities are being in-
vestigated of the final dis-
posal of spent fuel elements 
and HAW in crystalline for-
mations on domestic terri-
tory (granite). 
Possibilities are being stu-
died of final disposal in 
salt, loam/clay, anhydrite 
and crystalline formations. 
There are plans for studyi.ng 
possibilities of final dis-
posal in the geological for-
mations on domestic terri-
tory. 
see USSR 
Plans for final disposal 
of HAW in crystalline for-
mations are at the stage 
of basic design. 
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Tab. 5-4 (cont.) 
North America 
Canada 
USA 
South America 
Argentina 
Asia 
Japan 
lndia 
Pakistan 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
-granite (crystalline 
igneous pluton) 
-salt 
-deep-seated salt for-
mations 
-anhydrite 
-granite 
-. 
-slate 
-basalt 
-tuff 
-unsaturated rock 
-loam/clay 
There is a Plutonic Rock 
Programme for the Ontario 
section of the Canadian Shield 
with the aim of constructing 
a repository to be oparational 
in about the 2000. 
Possibilities are being studied 
of final disposal in various 
geological fo~mati9ns. 
There are plans for studying 
possibilities of final dis-
posal in geological forma-
tions on domestic territory. 
* Graniteformations have, inter alia, ~ very great vertical 
thickness; granite is one of the plutonites (= deep-seated 
magmatl.c rock) 
** seismic, geothermal, volcanically active 
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5. 8 .·5. 3 Countries wi th Plans for a Nuclear Energy Programme 
The following Table is a summary of information on the geology and 
nuclear energy programmes of individual states who have made known 
that they wish to utilize nuclear energy. 
Table 5-5 
Region/Country Geology 
EEC 
Luxemburg 
Denmark 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Greece 
Western Europe 
Portugal 
Austria 
iron ore 
salt domes 
(Southern Denmark) 
mobile region 
granite 
granite (Waldviertel), 
Alps 
geologically mobile 
region 
Nuclear Energy Programme 
There .are plans for study-
ing possibilities of final 
disposal in geological for-
mations on domestic terri-
tory. Two energy utilities 
have suggested final dis-
posal of HAW in the deep 
bore hole of the Mors salt 
dome. 
There are plans for study-
ing the possibilities of 
final disposal in geological 
formations on domestic terri-
tory. 
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Tab. S-5 (cont.) 
Eastern Europe 
Poland 
Hungary 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
Central and 
South America 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Peru 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Asia 
Turkey 
Iraq 
Iran 
North Korea 
Indonesia 
People's 
Republic of 
China 
Israel 
salt 
salt domes (Carpathians, Car-
pathian Foothills) 
mobile zone 
granite (small deposits) 
rock salt (Central 
Anatolia) 
thickness about 400 m, 
little explored mobile 
zone 
no deposits 
salt domes (Southern Persial 
granite complexes 
mobile zone 
salt in alternate strati-
fications with sand stone 
and slate (below the Dead 
Seal, mobile rift valley 
zone 
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Tab. 5-5 (cont.) 
Afr'ica 
Egypt 
Tunesia 
Zaire 
South Afr'ica 
belt of rock salt 
extending fr'om Alger'ia 
to Lybia, encircling 
Tunesia 
granite (southern Sinai) 
gypsum with r'OCk salt inter-
stratifications 
gypsum 
5.8.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Information is still lacking concerning particularly India, Pakistan, 
Taiwan, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil with respect to geological 
conditions. A more intensive study of the literature could be of 
assistance here. 
5.9 Final Disposal of Highly Active Waste from Reprocessing 
The problern of applying institutional models for the final dis-
posal of highly active waste from the reprocessing of spent 
fuel elements is essentially influenced by the criteria of 
proliferation hindrance and safeguardability. The decisive 
factor is the extent to which the concentration, volume and 
homogeneity of residual fissionable material in the waste 
can be reduced so that the safeguards authority can consent 
to release it from nuclear material safeguards. If this should 
be the case then evaluation could largely refer to the aspects 
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of supply and planning assurance as well as environmental 
protection. 
On the other band, if one presumes that a state is to base 
its energy supply on the operation of nuclear power stations 
and makes this dependent on safe waste management, then the 
highest degree of supply and planning assurance is given 
with a national repository. With respect to environmental 
protection, no significant disadvantages are to be perceived 
if one presumes that construction and operation would in 
every case be subject to the most stringent conditions. 
As far ·as social acceptance is concerned, disadvantages can 
be seen if for example spent fuel elements from third states 
are to be reprocessed and their radioactive waste deposited 
in the repository. The question of the repository's capacity 
in connection with deposits of foreign was~e could lead to 
this type of repository concept meeting with acceptance problems 
on the part of the population of the host country. For this 
reason an international _repository is not given any great 
chances of being realized. The disadvantages with respect 
to political acceptance and independence are thus added to 
disadvantages concerning supply and planning· assurance. 
With respect to profitability, it could on the other band 
also be argued that even a purely national waste repository 
could be designed in such a way that other highly dangerous, 
long-lived waste ~ such as heavy metal waste - could also 
be deposited there. In view of the serious problems in this 
connection, especially in the industrialized countries, accept-
ance could even be increased by this, if the effectiveness 
of environmental protection measures wer~ convincingly demonstrated. 
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6. ACCEPTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES 
Tbe discussion concerning tbe expansion of nuclear energy 
bas been virulent in tbe Federal Republic of Germany for 
many years. Tbis controversy bas still not yet been settled 
altbougb in tbe meantime more tban 20 % of tbe public electricity 
supply is generated on tbe basis of nuclear power stations. 
However, whereas the aversion to tbe operatio~ of nuclear 
power stations has abated somewhat, and a rejection of front-end 
plants in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. enrichment, never 
became apparent at all, resistance has been become concentrated 
on tbe waste management facilities in the fuel cycle, on 
reprocessing and final disposal. 
Tbis took place on tbe one band for tactical reasons since 
as the "bettle neck" in nuclear energy utilization, waste 
management plays a key role in tbe obstruction strategy of 
tbe opponents of nuclear energy. On the otber band, tbe opponents 
of nuclear energy bave succeeded in arousing certain reservations 
in the public at large against this tecbnology and waste 
management plants. Reasons for this could be found in tbe 
extremely small number of commercial reprocessing plants 
worldwide, in the apparently high susceptability to failure 
of some plants, in the political overempbasis on reprocessing, 
especially on the part of the USA, as well as in tbe "damnation" 
of tbe fissionable material plutonium whicb is isolated from 
the spent fuel elements during reprocessing and thus paves 
tbe way to the "dangerous plutonium economy" - a frequently 
heard but not precisely defined slogan. Finally, the prolifer-
ation-related aspects of reprocessing and plutonium utilization 
by technical recycling or in the fast breeder reactor have 
considerably reinforced acceptance deficits in tbe population 
at large. 
Reservations about tbe final disposal of highly active waste 
originate in the subliminal apprehension concerning disposal 
of waste in general, upon whicb recent negative experience 
in bandling.dangerous waste from industry and technology 
bas bad a reinforcing effect. Even the natural lack of experimental 
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trials for the centuries of final storage is taken as a con-
firmation of the reservations, in the same way as the protracted 
development phase of the planned repository in Gorleben, 
which can easily arouse doubts about the quality of this 
solution, especially in non-specialist observers. 
The approach discussed in the present study of obliging countries 
supplying nuclear power stations to provide front-end and 
especially spent fuel management services in the interests of 
minimizing the number of sensitive plants in the back-end 
of the nuclear fuel cycle, precisely this approach enters 
into this critical area for the acceptance of nuclear energy, 
namely spent fuel management. A strategy of this type would result 
in not only spent fuel elements from domestic nuclear power 
stations being reprocessed and highly active waste being 
stored, but moreover fuel elements from states to which nuclear 
power stations had been exported. The reprocessing capacity 
would thus be increased, and also the quantity of highly 
active waste to be disposed of. Even if this additional capacity 
and storage quantity were only to be in the range of a few 
percent of domestic requirements, the slogan "World's Nuclear 
Rubbish Dump" would achieve a considerable negative emphasis 
in evaluating the acceptance of this process. 
In answer to this type of acceptance reservation, it can 
be said that the actual quantity of additional materials 
for spent fuel management is extremely small and merely corresponds 
to the exported fraction of nuclear power station production. 
On the other hand, in future chances of exporting nuclear 
power stations will be considerably increased by an associated 
offer of nuclear front-end and back-end services, or even 
actually made possible by this. This assessment of the situation 
is confirmed by the fact that some other states exporting 
nuclear power are already technologically in a position to 
provide services of this type since the necessary plants 
already exist on their territory. From this point of view, 
support of this type can indeed be ncessary for possibilities 
of exporting nuclear facilities, which are undoubtedly among 
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the top technological products and are expert objects character-
istic of a highly developed country. This can lead to an 
improvement in the balance of payments and also to the maintenance 
of highly qualified jobs at home and thus can also be mentioned 
as an acceptance argument in favour of reprocessing. 
Moreover, the theory is put forward on the part of the Germans 
that the utilization of geological formations, especially 
rock salt, represents the most favourable solution for final 
disposal. A sufficient number of salt domes of this type 
are available in the North German Lewlands so that in principle 
this type of "optimum" solution for the final disposal of 
highly active fissionable products would also have to be 
available to those countries without such deposits or other 
similar. possibilities. 
In addition to economic, ecological and proliferation arguments, 
this leads to a further export-oriented argument in favour 
of constructing a reprocessing plant of an appropriate size 
on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, without 
which it would not be possible for the Germans to offer the 
spent fuel management services discussed above. 
Over and above bindering proliferation, which has already 
been discussed in detail above, further positive arguments 
could be put forward such as improving acceptance by creating 
better conditions on the already tight world markets, and 
reasons of practicability for final disposal in salt domes. 
Proliferation arguments opposed to reprocessing and breeder 
utilization recently put forward extensively in the nuclear 
energy controversy c~uld be neutralized by the proliferation-
hindering aspects of accepting supply and especially spent fuel 
management services for other countries, whether this be 
by reducing sensitive facilities, as has been propagandized 
by the United States for years, or by invalidating the argument 
of countries with small nuclear energy programmes that the 
- 124 -
lack of a complete nuclear fuel cycle would prevent nuclear. 
''emancipation~ or at least make it considerably more difficult: 
Up to now, possibilities of returning spent fuel elements 
are only available for the COMECON countries which send their 
spent fuel elements back to the USSR which also constructed 
the reactors. Other countries in the world have not had this 
possibility up to now so that the procedure suggested in 
this study could introduce a new concept of peaceful nuclear 
planning in some countries. 
The objective must therefore be to provide the population 
with more information, to invalidate accept~nce difficulties 
due to an increase in the amount of waste by factual arguments 
and at the same time to use the resulting advantages for 
improving the acceptance of reprocessing and final disposal 
in the Federal Republic. In the long term, the behaviour 
of the remaining countries supplying nuclear technology will 
move in this direction anyw~y and therefore the acceptance 
of such a procedure will be necessary. in our country if the 
Federal Republic wishes to continue playing a leading role 
in nuclear exports. 
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